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SURVEY OF ILLINOIS LAW FOR THE YEAR 1943-1944*
I. BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS

S

CORPORATIONS

EPARATENESS of identity between two corporations has
been recognized as a necessary corollary to the entity
theory of corporate existence even though both may have a
common group of shareholders or one is but a subsidiary of
the other.' That theory may, however, be carried too far according to the decision in Zehen&er & Factor,Inc. v. Murphy,
which held constitutional that section of the Unemployment
Compensation Act 3 which purports to treat as one employing
unit any two or more enterprises which fall under one control.'
Whatever the rule may be on other legal questions, the court
indicated that to permit decentralization of business enterprises through a series of corporations so as to escape the
burden of compensation assessments imposed by that statute
was carrying the entity theory beyond its valid limits. 5 A
claim that the statute was discriminatory as well as indefinite
was rejected. Adoption of the corporate form of doing business will not, therefore, serve as a means of avoiding liability
for the unemployment compensation tax if control is, in fact,
* The present survey is not intended in any sense as a complete commentary
upon, or annotation of, the cases decided by the Illinois courts during the past
year, but is published rather for the purpose of calling attention merely to cases
and developments believed significant and interesting. The period covered is
that of the judicial year, embracing from 383 Il1. 300 to 386 Ill.627; from 319
Ill. App. 255 to 323 Ill.
App. 73; and from 135 F. (2d) 632 to 142 F. (2d) 568.
1 Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U. S. 333, 45 S. Ct. 250, 69 L. Ed.
634 (1925); Lowenthal Securities Co. v. White Paving Co., 351 Ill. 285, 184 N. E.
310 (1933); Seymour v. Woodstock Traction Co., 281 Ill.
84, 117 N. E. 729 (1917).
2386 Ill. 258, 53 N. E. (2d) 944 (1944).
.3Ill.Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 48, §217 et .seq.
4 Ibid., §218(e) (5).
5 Similar holdings on almost identical statutes in thirteen other states were
noted by the court; 386 Ill. 258 at 265, 53 N. E. (2d) 944 at 948.
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still vested in the hands of those who dominated the enterprise in the past.
Accommodation between the shareholder and the corporate
management over the question of the former's right to inspect
the books and records of his company has been made the subject of much legislative tinkering and not a little judicial attention. In an effort to prevent placing hindering obstacles in
the path of the one but at the same time relieving the other
of unnecessary burdensome investigations, a rule has been devised which entitles the shareholder to compel an inspection
through the use of mandamus proceedings in addition to his
right to collect a penalty for an improper denial of the privilege of inspection.6 The statute which sanctions both, however, places the limitation thereon that the inspection shall be
"for any proper purpose," and that phrase has given rise to
the question as to whether it is the burden of the shareholder
to prove his purpose is a proper one or is rather upon the
corporation and its officials to show some improper motive on
his part. Resolution of that question was handed down in the
case of Morris v. Broadview, Inc.,' where it was held that the
burden is on the shareholder even though that may cause
him to undertake the duty of proving a negative. As the
instances of improper probing into corporate records are few
compared with the many cases in which the shareholder,
through such examination, has discovered corroborative evidence of what was merely a suspicion of mismanagement the
desirability of such a holding is open to question.
One reason which may have deterred the bringing of representative suits to enforce claims belonging to the corporation
was the doubt that the successful shareholder would be reimbursed for the expense and effort involved. The decision
in Bingham v. Ditzler I will serve to remove such doubt for it
recognizes the principle, long followed in other cases of similar
character,' that the party who, at his own expense, has main6 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 32, §157.45.

385 Il. 228, 52 N. E. (2d) 769 (1944), noted in 22 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REVIEW 201, reversing 317 Ill. App. 436, 46 N. E. (2d) 174 (1943).
8 320 Ill. App. 88, 49 N. E. (2d) 812 (1943), noted in 22 CHICAGO-KENT
LAW REVIEW 159.
9 As to trusts, see Abend v. Endowment Fund Commission, 174 Ill. 96, 50
N. E. 1052 (1897); in will cases, see Emmert v. Hill, 226 li. App. 1 (1922),
cert. denied 226 Ill. App. xx; in partition, see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 106, §40.
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tained a successful suit for the preservation, protection, or
increase of a common fund should be reimbursed for his labor.
The fact that his own participation in the fund is so minute
that he will personally gain little from the augmentation
thereof is insufficient to defeat his right to seek compensation.
The holding in that case, however, suggests that the burden
of such expense, while chargeable against the fund, ought
properly be borne by those found guilty of such wrongdoing
as to make litigation necessary. Under the present Business
Corporation Act,1" the liability of the guilty directors appears
limited to restoring the loss caused to the corporation. Amendment of that statute to include the cost of such representative litigation as an item of damage collectible from such directors might seem desirable.
In an effort to work out the difficult problems produced,
during the recent depression, by wholesale defaults in mortgage bond issues many different forms of reorganization plans
were developed. Some of them contemplated eventual liquidatiofn of the mortgaged premises by liquidating trustees for the
benefit of participating certificate holders. Others were constructed around new corporations organized to take over the
distressed properties and to continue their operation but having management, for a period of time, in the hands of voting
trustees under stock voting trusts. Each form possessed advantages, but each likewise had certain inherent weaknesses. One
weakness in the latter form is demonstrated in the litigation
begun in Nelson v. Amling" by voting trustees of the stock of
such a corporation seeking a construction of the terms of the
voting trust agreement that would permit them to approve a
transfer of the corporate assets to a liquidation trust. The
objective of such suit was to make a change in the form of the
enterprise in order to avoid the heavy taxes and burdensome
administrative details attendant upon the corporate form of
doing business. 2 While the trial court looked favorably on
that proposal, the decree was reversed when the Appellate
Court for the First District concluded that the entire purpose
1o Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 32, §157.42.
11 319 Ill. App. 571, 49 N. E. (2d) 868 (1943).
12 Whether tax saving could be accomplished in that fashion is a matter of
some doubt: Swanson v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 296 U. S. 362, 56 S. Ct. 283,
80 L. Ed. 273 (1935).
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of the adoption of the corporate plan for reorganization was
to insure continuity of operation rather than liquidation, hence
held that the powers of the voting trustees were limited in
that regard. A shift from one plan to the other, 13 even though
eminently desirable, is not possible unless with the consent of
the beneficiaries.
As liquidation of closed state banks progresses there is
likelihood that shareholders who have paid their superadded
liability may become entitled to refunds of amounts overpaid,
particularly where the assets of the closed bank have proved
to be reasonably sound and have provided a source of funds
for distribution to depositors and other creditors. The decision in the earlier case of Heine v. Degen"4 tended to indicate
that any question of refund would have to wait until all such
creditors had been paid in full. That holding, however, has
been negated by the action of the Illinois Supreme Court in
Holderman v. Moore State Bank," where it was pointed out that
a shareholder was entitled to refund as soon as the claims of
only those creditors who became such during his period* of
stock ownership had been satisfied in full. It was deemed a
matter of no significance that other creditors remained unpaid.
That part of such satisfaction took the form of distributions
made by the receiver of the closed bank drawn from its general assets was also accounted immaterial. Although such holding may be just as between the shareholder and his particular
creditors, it does not take into account the doctrine of marshalling of assets which might have been invoked by the other
unpaid creditors of the bank. Had they protested, it is possible
that an early refund of overpayments might be indirectly
prevented. 6
The average stock transfer agent will refuse to approve a
transfer of corporate shares unless the endorsed certificate
bears a guaranteed signature. The effect and significance of
such guarantee was brought into consideration in Mudge V.
1 The converse of the instant case was attempted in In re Wedgewood
Co., 125 F. (2d) 327 (1942), but the proposal to change from a liquidation
into a corporation was likewise rejected.
14 362 Ill. 357, 199 N. E. 832 (1936).
15 383 Ill. 534, 50 N. E. (2d) 741 (1943), noted in 22 CHICAGO-KENT
REVIEW 216.
16 For a further analysis of this point see note to Holderman v. Moore
Bank in 22 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 216, particularly pp. 218-9.
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Mitchell Hutchins & Company, Inc.," where a brokerage house
was sued as a converter on the theory that by unconditionally
guaranteeing the signature of a trustee in whose name the
shares were registered it had aided the trustee to convert the
shares to his own use. The court held that in the absence
of actual knowledge of the trustee's lack of authority and also
of his purpose to convert such shares, the brokerage firm was
not liable to the beneficiaries of the trust. Such holding was
predicated on the theory that the exemption now provided by
Section 3 of the Uniform Fiduciaries Act," although not applicable because enacted after the transaction there involved,
represented a codification of an established public policy existing prior to its enactment which would serve to protect persons
dealing with the fiduciary unless they possesed actual knowledge of his wrongful purpose. Had the action on the guarantee been brought by the corporation -whose shares were involved, assuming some damage could be shown, a different result might have followed. 9
An exemption is provided by Section 5(1) of the so-called
"Blue Sky law 20 whereby the sale of corporate securities by
a vendor who is a bona fide owner thereof and who sells for
his own account is not subject to the provisions of that statute.
Under a former statute such sales were exempted only if they
represented isolated transactions, 2' but that limitation was not
carried over into the current revision so that the offering of
even a large block of shares to many different purchasers would
appear to be exempted if made by the owner for his own account. A seemingly new limitation appears to have been read
into the text of the law by the Appellate Court decision in
Scully v. DeMet 12 which denied recognition to the exemption
when it appeared that the vendor made the sales through
1"322 Ill. App. 409, 54 N. E. (2d) 708 (1944), noted post p. 99. It is understood that leave to appeal has been denied.
38 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 98, §236.
19 Jennie Clarkson Home, etc. v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co., 182 N. Y. 47, 74
N. E. 571, 70 L. R. A. 787 (1905).
20ll. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 121 , §100(1).
21 Ill. Laws 1919, p. 351, §5; Il1.
Laws 1921, p. 357, §5; Ill. Laws. 1931, p.
816, §5.
22 323 Ill. App. 74, 55 N. E. (2d) 101 (1944).
It is understoood that leave to
appeal was denied, but a petition to reconsider such ruling and grant leave to
appeal is said to have been filed in the Illinois Supreme Court by persons not
connected with the litigation but seeking to serve as amict curiae. No ruling
on such petition has, as yet, been announced.
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licensed brokers to the public at large. The court seemed to
feel that exempted sales should be limited to private offerings as, for example, to institutional investors who could
conduct their own investigation before purchasing rather than
to indiscriminate offerings to members of the general public
who would be apt to rely on the assurance, impliedly conveyed
from the fact that the sale was through a licensed broker, that
the securities were qualified ones.
Although technically involving a problem of the rights of
a creditor, the decision of the United States Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Molner v. South Chicago
Savings Bank 23 has significance as it affects the qualifications
required of a director in an Illinois state bank. By statute in
this state such director is required to own and deposit shares
of stock in the bank of which he is a director.2 Upon ceasing
to be the owner thereof, he becomes disqualified to act and his
office becomes vacant. The obvious purpose of such statute
was to provide some method of protection to those who do business with the bank and to insure, at least to some slight degree, that the director would perform his duties faithfully.
Despite the purpose of such statute, it was held that the
shares so deposited by a bank director might be reached by
garnishment at the instance of his individual creditors thus
depriving the bank not only of the director's services but also
of the protection thus afforded.
Opposition to branch banking, evidenced by statutory prohibition thereof, has been made the basis of preventing foreign national banks from obtaining license to accept or execute trusts in this state according to the decision of Boatmen's National Bank of St. Louis v. Hughfes. 6 The bank concerned in that case first sought a license to do business in
Illinois as a foreign corporation 27 and then hoped to gain the
benefits of the provision of the federal statute which grants
to national banks the same power to act in any fiduciary
capacity as is enjoyed by state banks and trust companies
23 138 F. (2d)
201 (1943), noted in 22 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 213
and 22 N. Car. L. Rev. 57. Major, C. J., wrote a dissenting opinion.
24 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 16
, §4.
25 Ibid., Ch. 16.Y,
§9.
26 385 Ill. 431, 53 N. E. (2d) 403 (1944).
27 fll. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 32, §157.102.
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with which it might come into competition. 8 Its attempt to
compel the issuance of such license on original proceedings
for mandamus2 9 failed when the Illinois Supreme Court denied
the writ. The court indicated that application could have been
rejected because (1) the name of the foreign corporation included the term "Bank" forbidden by one section of the Business Corporation Act" and failed to include the word "Trust"
required by another section;31 and (2) the purpose of the provision in the federal law was merely to place the national
bank on an equal competitive basis with state banks in the
state in which the national bank was situated.32 A more serious obstacle, however, was found to exist in the Illinois statutory provision prohibiting branch banking. Since the foreign
corporation was planning to maintain a branch office in this
state, even though for the limited purpose of accepting and
executing trusts here, it was treated as preparing to engage
in the banking business3 through such branch office in a manner which would clearly be forbidden to a domestic corporation. Apparently the only solution would be for the foreign
corporation to organize a domestic subsidiary.
The acquisition of jurisdiction over foreign corporations
not licensed to do business within the state 4 has been made
to depend on the fact that such corporation has done business
within the state." Ingenious attempts to avoid that implication have been devised. One such method was up for consideration in Pergl v. U. S. Axle Company 6 where the foreign
corporation relied on the point that its only connection with
U. S. C. A. §248(k).
Ill. Const. 1870, Art. VI, §2.
-o Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 32, §157.104.
31 Ibid., §157.9.
22 First Nat. Bank v. Fellows ex rel. Union Trust Co., 244 U. S. 416, 37 S. Ct.
734, 61 L. Ed. 1233, L. R. A. 1918C 283 (1917).
33 Trust business done by a bank has been treated as much like banking as
receiving deposits and loaning funds: Watt v. Cecil, 368 Il. 510, 15 N. E. (2d)
292 (1938).
34 If
so licensed, jurisdiction may be readily acquired by reason of Ill. Rev.
Stat. 1943, Ch. 32, §157.102, §157.109, and §157.111.
35 See Eulette, Service of Process upon Foreign Corporations-Constitutional
Limitations Imposed by Judicial Construction of the Due Process Clauses, 20
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 287 (1942), and Munsert, Doing Business in a
State for the Purpose of Service of Process on a Foreign Corporation, 13
CHICAGO-KENT REVIEW 328 (1935).
S6 320 Ill. App. 115, 50 N. E. (2d) 115 (1943), noted in 22 CHICAGO-KENT
LAW REVIEW 157.
2812

29
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this state lay in the fact that it had on deposit in a warehouse here a quantity of its products which the warehouse
owner was free to store or sell without prior approval. It
was argued that such warehouse owner was not an agent of
the foreign corporation for service of process on the latter
but was merely its bailee. In an earlier Illinois case, that of
The Thomas Manufacturing Company v. Thede,37 the mere
deposit of goods in the state was regarded as insufficient to
confer jurisdiction over the non-resident foreign corporation
particularly since approval for the sale of such goods had to
be obtained from the corporation in its home state. The
validity of that holding has been shaken by the decision in
the Pergl case for almost identical conduct was there held
sufficient to support jurisdiction.
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT

Courts have applied the doctrine of respondeat superior
to widely varying factual situations as each case must depend on its own peculiar facts. In Hogan v. City of Chicago8
the court applied that rule of vicarious liability to a municipal
employer for the employee's use of his own car where it was
expected that the employee would use such automobile about
the master's business even though he was not employed to
drive a car nor was any of the expense of its operation borne
by the city. In that case the employee was a garbage collector
who, after reporting for work at the ward office, was then sent
to a designated loading point. Knowledge that the employee
was using his car to reach the scene of actual labor together
with the fact that he was conveying the foreman to that
point was deemed sufficient to hold the municipality liable
for an accident as a principal. Liability on the employer's
part was, however, denied in Haynes v. Holman, 9 where an
automobile salesman, driving his own car, was taking a prospective customer to the employer's salesroom to pick up a
water pump, as the evidence disclosed that the employee
was hired solely to sell cars on commission and the parts department was under the charge of another employee.
37
38
39

186 Ill. App. 248 (1914).
319 Il. App. 531, 49 N. E. (2d) 861 (1943).
319 Ill. App. 396, 49 N. E. (2d) 324 (1943).
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Mention was made last year of the question of the liability of an infant principal for the negligence of his companion while driving the infant's car with the latter's permission. 0 Notice was taken at that time that although the
infant could not be held on any agency theory there was the
possibility that liability could attach if it were found that
the minor was exercising control over the driver at the time
so that the driver's negligence might be imputed to the infant. "
Upon a new trial of that case on amended pleadings, pursuant
to mandate, it was held in Palmer v. Miller4' that a judgment
against the infant on the suggested theory should be upheld.
The line between the agent or employee on the one hand
and the independent contractor on the other is often hard
to draw. There has also been indication in the past that
those who might be called independent contractors for most
purposes will be treated as agents or employees for purpose
of computing unemployment compensation taxes.42 Somewhat
startling, therefore, is the decision of the majority of the
Illinois Supreme Court in Ozark Minerals Company v. Murphy"
which holds that persons under contract to furnish silica to
be mined on the land of, and with tools furnished by, the
"employer" are to be classed as independent contractors because (1) compensation was payable on the basis of the number of tons of accepted product, (2) the "employees" were
under no duty to furnish any given amount, and (3) were
free to work for others if they wished. If the purpose of the
statute is to provide benefits to all workers whose security
might be affected by unemployment, 2 the holding therein
seems to open a door to escape from the burdens of such tax
which might seriously disrupt the whole legislative purpose.
(2d) 973 (1942), reversing 310
40 Palmer v. Miller, 380 Ill. 256, 43 N. E.
Ill. App. 582, 35 N. E. (2d) 104 (1941), noted in 21 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REVIEW 195, 31 Ill. B. J. 355.
41 See discussion of Palmer v. Miller in 22 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
45-6.
42 323 Ill. App. 528, 56 N. E. (2d) 447 (1944).
43 See Peasley v. Murphy, 381 Ill. 187, 44 N. E.
(2d) 876, 143 A. L. R. 414
(1942). Notice has also been made, ante p. 1, of the decision in Zehender &
Factor, Inc., v. Murphy, 386 Ill. 258, 53 N. E. (2d) 944 (1944), where a similar
disregard of usual concepts has been made on another problem involving
unemployment taxes.
44 384
ill. 94, 51 N. E. (2d) 197 (1943). Murphy, J.,. wrote a concurring
opinnion, while Thompson, J., wrote a vigorous dissent.
45 See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 48, §217.
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Although many cases involving questions concerning the
right to workmen's compensation reached the courts during
the past year, it is noteworthy that none of them involved
unusual principles of law, most such cases turning upon disputed questions of fact. The same observation is true as to
the subject of partnership and other forms of unincorporated
business association.
II. CONTRACTS
General principles of contract law are seldom made the
basis of appellate comment or change for, like the doctrines
of property law, such principles have come to possess a wellunderstood and almost inflexible meaning. On the surface,
therefore, there would seem to be nothing new in the decision
of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit in Bryan v. Creaves' which holds that a release given
one joint tort feasor operates to release others even though
language therein expressly attempted to reserve rights
against such others. Had the question involved the release
of liability of a joint contract debtor, the express reservation
would probably have been construed so as to make the document into a covenant not to sue in order to carry out the
true intent of the parties.' Whether there is validity in drawing such distinction between releases given in tort situations
and those used where a joint debt is involved is, however,
a matter of some question for it has been argued that there
should be no difference between the two cases.2
Equally fundamental would seem to be the right of a
contracting party to assign the benefits of a non-personal contract. Two of the divisions of the Appellate Court for the
First District, though, are in conflict over the ability of a
beneficiary under the so-called "industrial" life insurance
policy, after death of the insured, to assign or pledge the
benefits of the policy as security for the payment of the
funeral expenses incurred in burying the insured. Such conflict seems to have arisen by reason of certain clauses customarily found in policies of that type purporting to deny
1138 F. (2d) 377 (1943), noted in 32 Ill. B. J. 351.
2 Parmelee v. Lawrence, 44 1l. 405 (1867).

3 See note on Bryan v. Creaves in 32 Il. B. J. 351, particularly 352-3.
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the right to make an assignment and also permitting the company to facilitate payment by paying the proceeds to any
one of a given class of persons. The First Division, in Standard Discount Company V. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company4 and also in Morticians' Acceptance Company v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company,5 have indicated that the
rights of the beneficiary are vested upon death of the insured and, being property, may be freely assigned despite such
clauses. The Third Division, on the other hand, has been
equally emphatic that the proceeds of the policy are nonassignable.6 Clarification of the issue by the Illinois Supreme
Court is anticipated.'
War-time restrictions and regulations affect many business contracts, but whether such regulations make a given
contract impossible of performance is not an easy question
to answer.' One application of the doctrine of impossibility
of performance was requested by a tenant, in Deibler v.
6 when it was urged that
Bernard Brothers, Incorporated
federal regulations concerning the sale of automobiles had so
adversely affected the tenant's use of the demised premises as
to justify the conclusion that the lease had been terminated
by operation of law thereby relieving him of liability for the
rent reserved. Although the leased premises had been used
as a showroom for the sale of new automobiles, the lease itself was silent as to any restrictive covenant limiting the
same to that type of business, consequently the court held
that the tenant was free to utilize the premises for any lawful
purpose and the lease was not cancelled by the acts of administrative officials of the federal government. Had the lease
been so limited, or had the rental been calculated on the
4321 Ill. App. 220, 53 N. E. (2d) 27 (1944).
5 321 Ill. App. 277, 53 N. E. (2d) 30 (1944). Leave to appeal has been
allowed.
Life Ins. Co., 322 Ill. App. 643, 54 N. E. (2d) 736
6 Lain v. Metropolitan
(1944).
7It
is understood that leave to appeal has been granted in the Morticians'
Acceptance Co. case, and in the Lain case. A discussion of all three cases, including other significant points involved therein, may be found in 22 CHICAGOKENT LAW REVIEW 269.
8 In general, see Richard "Effect of the Present War on Contracts," 18 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 164 (1940).
9385 Ill. 610, 53 N. E. (2d) 450 (1944), affirming 319 Ill. App. 504, 48 N. E.
(2d) 422 (1943).
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volume of, or profits arising from the conduct of, such business a much closer question would have been generated and
might have produced a different result."
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS

An interesting question concerning the maturity date of
a promissory note was presented by the unique facts of the
case of In re Feldman's Estate- in which no small part of the
difficulty was produced by the inept fashion in which the
instrument was drafted. 2 The note in question was dated
March 1, 1931, but no demand for payment thereof was made
until after the death of the maker, which occurred in 1941,
when the legal representative of the payee presented a claim
against the maker's estate. The executor objected to allowance of such claim on the ground that action on. the note
was barred by the statute of limitations for the note, being
purportedly due "on or before date," would, under Section 7
of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1 be a demand note.
The payee's representative, however, contended that a marginal notation on the instrument, which read "Due Mar. 1,
1939," made the document into a note payable at a fixed point
of time, hence the limitation period had not expired when
the claim was filed. On appeal from an order disallowing the
claim, both in the county and the circuit court, the Appellate
Court held that, inasmuch as ambiguity existed between the
body of the note and the marginal memorandum thereon, the
provision in the body was controlling"4 and as a consequence
the claim was properly denied as being stale. The Illinois
Supreme Court granted leave to appeal and its decision, although technically not in the period of this survey, requires
notice for it reversed all of the inferior holdings and directed
allowance of the claim"5 on the theory that while marginal
10 From an analogy to cases concerning leases for saloon purposes, however,
it would seem that the tenant would have to stipulate for protection against
a supervening illegality or impossibility of performance before being excused:
Hoefeld v. Ozello, 290 Ill. 147, 125 N. E. 5 (1919); Imbeschied v. Lerner, 241
Mass. 199, 135 N. E. 219, 22 A. L. R. 819 (1922).
11 Sub nom. Van Zele v. Smaltz, 320 Ill. App. 243, 50 N. E. (2d) 766 (1943).
12A
complete understanding of the problem requires reproduction of the
note. It is set out in facsimile in 387 Ill. 568 at 570, 56 N. E. (2d) 405 at 406.
13 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 98, §27.
14 See authorities cited in 10 C. J. S., Bills and Notes, §44.
15 387 Ill. 568, 56 N. E. (2d) 405 (1944), reversing 320 Ill. App. 243, 50 N. E.
(2d) 766 (1943). Smith, C. J., and Murphy, J., dissented.
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memoranda are not controlling over the words in the body of
an instrument still they can be looked to in order to help re6
solve ambiguity appearing in the body of the note itself."
That internal ambiguity was found to exist because the printed
word "after" in the phrase "after date" had been deleted and,
by the addition of written words, the note had been made to
read "on or before date" as though it were the intention of the
parties that the note might be payable even before any loan
had been made! The strained effect that such construction
would require induced the court to adopt, as the true maturity
date, the day named in the marginal notation.
INSURANCE

Unusual circumstances surrounding the death of holders
of life insurance policies while engaged in the armed forces of
the United States will undoubtedly produce much litigation in
the near future. Of contemporary and possible future value,
therefore, is the decision in Bull v. Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada1 7 in which suit was based on a policy issued
to a serviceman at the time he was a naval aviation cadet.
The policy excluded coverage from death as a result "directly
or indirectly, of service, travel or flight in any species of air
craft, as passenger or otherwise." The insured was obliged to
make a forced sea landing from the effects of enemy gunfire
and, while he was attempting to launch a rubber life boat, the
airplane was again shelled and exploded. The insured was
never seen thereafter, but it could be inferred that he was
killed by gunfire. With one judge dissenting, the majority held
that there had been a disengagement from service, travel or
flight in that airplane at that time, hence the policy covered
the death thus occasioned.
Section 356 (f) of the Insurance Code18 requires that exceptions to coverage in accident and casualty policies must, to
be effective, be given the same prominence as the benefits
thereby given. It was contended, in Custer v. Lincoln National
Life Insurance Company,19 that such statute had no applicaSee cases cited in .7 Am. Jur., Bills and Notes, §§49-60.
Major, C. J., wrote a dissenting opinion
18111. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 73, §968(f).
19141 F. (2d) 144 (1944).
16

17 141 F. (2d) 456 (1944).
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tion to the policy there involved since the same was primarily
one of life insurance. It appeared, however, that the company
had issued a "Principal Contract" of life insurance to which
was physically atttached a "Supplemental Contract" covering
acidental death. Finding that each was, in fact, a sufficiently
complete contract calling for separate premiums, the court
disregarded the manner of attachment and held the statute applicable to the supplemental one. Recovery was permitted
thereon, even though the insured died from homicidal means
of the type excepted in the exclusion clause, when the court
found that such clause was in smaller type and lacked the
prominence given to other provisions of the contract. Although the federal court could find no Illinois Supreme Court
decision in point, it quoted with approval from an Appellate
Court case which had stated that the plain purpose of the
statute was "to compel insurance companies to fairly apprise
the insured of all conditions in a policy that limit the beneficial provisions of the policy."2
When an insured owns only one automobile at the time
he applies for a public liability policy and that very car is involved in a subsequent accident during the policy term, a
question may arise as to whether the insurer should escape
liability if the policy inaccurately describes that automobile
through a variation in the motor and serial numbers and the
year of make because of the insured's fault but in the absence
of bad faith on his part. That question was answered in the
negative in Kostecki v. Zafflna.2 1 Lacking authoritative precedent in Illinois, the court found support for its answer in decisions from California, Iowa, Michigan and Missouri as well as
from its own reasoning. The court intimated, however, that
an opposite result would probably follow had the policy protection covered fire and theft since the rate of premium might
be different for the various models of automobiles.
SALES

Of principal significance in the field of sales law is the
final outcome of the case of Donn v. Auto Dealers Investment
2Porter v. Continental Casualty Co., 277 Ill.App. 492 at 499 (1934).
21 384 Ill.192, 51 N. E. (2d) 152 (1943), noted in 42 Mich. L. Rev. 947, reversing 316 I1. App. 509, 45 N. E. (2d) 562 (1942).
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Company to which attention was previously drawn by the
holding of the Appellate Court giving priority to the possessor
of a trust receipt who had first given notice of intention to
engage in trust receipt financing 2 even though the actual advancement of funds was postponed until after another had, in
fact, made a similar advancement on the same property by
taking the same type of security.2 3 Upon leave to appeal being
granted, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed such decision and
decided that priority had to be accorded to the person who
first, in fact, advanced the funds. 4 The court rejected the
theory that the person who gives notice of an intention to
engage in trust receipt financing thereby acquires an inchoate
security interest which might later ripen into an actual one.
It also seemed to be unimpressed by the argument that to require inquiry before advancement would impede the normal
flow of business. The case was well argued in both courts and
the final decision seems sound. As the case represents a situation of first impression in any jurisdiction, it is likely that the
decision will become a leading case in those states where the
Uniform Trust Receipts Act is in force.
QUASI-CONTRACTS

So emphatic is the rule of law that municipal corporations
may not enter into binding contracts except pursuant to law
that recovery has been denied even on a quasi-contractual
theory for the reasonable value of the performance under any
contract rendered invalid by reason of non-compliance with
statutory requirements. 25 A logical extension of that doctrine
was made in W. Q. O'NeaU Company of Illinois v. Coon Run
Drainageand Levee District ' when the same rule was applied
to a drainage district organized under statute which, while not
strictly a municipal corporation, possesses many of the aspects
of such public bodies. Despite the fact that the defendant
22 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 1211/2, §178.
2s Donn v. Auto Dealers Inv. Co., 318 fl. App. 95, 47 N. E. (2d) 568 (1943),
noted in 22 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 52 and 99.
24385 Ill. 211, 52 N. E. (2d) 695 (1944), noted in 22 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REVIEW 145 and 32 Il. B. J. 279.
25 Hancock v. Village of Hazel Crest, 318 Ill. App. 170, 47 N. E.(2d) 557
(1943); Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. City of Virginia, 314 Inl. App. 238, 41
N. E. (2d) 342 (1942).
-26 319 Ill. App. 324, 49 N. E. (2d) 283 (1943).
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district had accepted plaintiff's materials and had incorporated
the same in its public works so that return thereof was impossible, recovery in quantum meruit was denied.
It is a well-recognized doctrine also that courts will not
usually act in cases where the parties have fully performed an
illegal contract but rather will leave them in the position they
have placed themselves. That rule, however, does not apply
to suits brought by a trustee in bankruptcy for one of the
parties, according to Chatz v. Bloomf 7 for he is said to stand
in a different position than his illegally acting bankrupt. As
a consequence, the former was permitted to maintain an action
to recover a portion of an insurance commission paid over by
the bankrupt broker to the insured. Although there can be no
dispute that the division of such commissions is illegal,2 8 and
that the trustee in bankruptcy is not barred by the reprehensible conduct of the bankrupt,29 yet the court seemingly overlooked the fact that the remedy for the recovery of any such
divided commission is, by the same statute which makes the
act illegal, placed in the insurance company. 0 It would seem,
therefore, that the action should have been maintained by the
latter rather than by the trustee in bankruptcy.
III. CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE.
Cases which do not involve some issue of practice or procedure are rare, yet many of the questions presented to the
reviewing courts each year may be dismissed as being trite.
Those cases which did present some novelty in procedural law
during the past year are here summarized and arranged in
roughly the same order as the question would be likely to arise
in the mind of a lawyer engaged in preparing or presenting his
client's case.
AVAILABILITY OF REMEDIES

Of first concern to the practitioner should be the question
of whether or not the tribunal he contemplates using possesses
jurisdiction, for if it does not all his other efforts will prove
21

322 Ill. App. 435, 54 N. E.

(2d)

889 (1944).

Leave to appeal has been

allowed.
28111. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 73, §§763-4.
29 Thomas v. Sugerman, 157 F. 669, 15 L. R. A. (N.S.) 1267 (1907).
30 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 73, §764.
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futile. It would be expected that by this time all doubts as
to the power of the Illinois courts to hear and determine cases
would be resolved.1 Such is, however, far from the case for
aftermath of the effects of the decision in Werner v. Illinois
Central Railroad Company2 may be observed in the action
' where it was
taken in Herb v. Pitcairn
held that an Illinois
city court was without jurisdiction to grant change of venue
to an appropriate circuit court4 so as to save an action, commenced in apt time but filed in the wrong court, from the defense of the statute of limitations. Such holding is clearly
contradictory to the view expressed in the earlier case of
Central Illinois Public Service Company v. Industrial Commission5 and seems extremely unfortunate inasmuch as in no
other instance is the statute permitted to operate as a bar if
the action is commenced within the time permitted even
though subsequent amendment of some sort becomes necessary.' It would logically seem to follow that appeals to the
wrong court should be dismissed rather than transferred, 7 yet
the court has exercised the right to transfer causes in many
instances during the past year without giving any thought to
possible invalidity in such practice.
Notice has been taken elsewhere of the decision in McFarlin v. McFarlin' which deals with the related problem of
the scope of jurisdiction of city courts in divorce cases. But
equally confusing is the theory underlying the decision of the
Illinois Supreme Court in Moffett v. Green9 in which it was
held that city courts had appellate jurisdiction over judgments by justices of the peace, acting for a township located
wholly within a municipality possessing a city court, even
though the cause of action arose outside the territorial area
1 Appellate jurisdiction is treated separately in the subsection which appears
at page 33 post.
2 379 Ill. 559, 42 N. E. (2d) 82 (1942), noted in 21 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 116, reversing 309 Ill. App. 292, 33 N. E. (2d) 121 (1941).
3 384 fl1. 237, 51 N. E. (2d) 277 (1943), noted in 32 fl1. B. J. 347.
4 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 146, §36.
5 293 Ill. 62, 127 N. E. 80 (1920). See also Gill v. Lynch, 367 fl1. 203, 10 N. E.
(2d) 812 (1937).
6 See Metropolitan Trust Co. v. Bowman Dairy Co., 369 Ill. 222, 15 N. E. (2d)
838 (1938).
7 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, §210.
8 384 Ill. 428, 51 N. E. (2d) 520 (1943), noted post, p. 48. Wilson, J., dissented.
9386 Ill. 318, 53 N. E. (2d) 941 (1944). Smith, C. J., dissented.
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of both the township and the city. Had the action been originally instituted in the city court, jurisdiction to hear the
cause would be entirely absent by reason of the Werner decision. When, however, the case reaches that court on appeal,
even though it is to be tried there de novo, appellate jurisdiction is said to attach under the statute"0 because the thing
involved, i. e. the judgment of the justice of the peace, arose
within the corporate limits. If the city court is to be confined for use by residents of the city and for the purpose of
settling disputes arising therein, it is somewhat strained to
hold that it may possess an appellate jurisdiction foreign to
that purpose. The unsettlement produced by the Werner decision, therefore, seems to be far from subsiding.
Any doubts which may have existed as to the right of
Illinois courts, otherwise competent, to hear and determine
civil cases arising under the Emergency Price Control Act of
i94211 were removed by the decision in Regan v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Company" which not only held such statute to
be a constitutional exercise of the war powers 1 but also
pointed out that the provision thereof concerning suits "in
any court of competent jurisdiction' '1 4 was not intended to
limit such proceedings to federal courts. The claim that no
action could be maintained here to recover a penalty under a
foreign law was likewise held inapplicable since federal statutes were deemed not to be "foreign law" within the meaning
of such rule. 6 By applying equally well established principles,
the court in Wieboldt Stores, Inc. v. Sturdy17 came to the conclusion that the Municipal Court of Chicago has jurisdiction
to send its garnishment process beyond the territorial limits
of the city in aid of any valid judgment which it may have
had occasion to pronounce. Although original process could
0 1l. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 37, §344.
n150 U. S. C. A. § 925 et seq.
-2386 Ill.
284, 54 N. E. (2d) 210 (1944). Thompson, J., wrote a dissenting opinion but based the same solely on the ground that the judgment was manifestly
against the weight of the evidence.
13 U. S. Const., Art. I, §8.
14 50 U. S. C. A. §925(e).
15 Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U. S. 657, 13 S. Ct. 224, 36 L. Ed. 1123 (1892).
16

U. S. Const., Art. VI.

17 384 Ill. 271, 51 N. E. (2d)

(2d) 566 (1943).

268 (1943), afflrming 318 Ill. App. 191, 47 N. E.
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not be served beyond the municipal limits, 8 proceedings by
way of garnishment have long been regarded as auxiliary to
a jurisdiction which has previously attached' and, by analogy
to cases concerning the powers of city courts,2 0 power was
said to reside in such court to enforce its judgments by execution"' or other lawful means anywhere in the state.
Jurisdiction involves more than the power to hear and
determine, for problems of venue and service of process must
be faced. Section 50(5) of the Civil Practice Act," for example, fixes venue for purpose of taking judgment by confession in either the county where the note was executed or
where one or more of the defendants reside. A similar requirement is laid down in Rule 185 of the Municipal Court of Chicago.2 ' It was argued, in Greenberg v. Neiman, that such
provisions were jurisdictional so that no valid judgment could
be entered by confession against a non-resident defendant in
such court where the note was executed outside of Cook
County. The majority of the court was able to evade the
necessity of deciding such question by finding that the petition
of the defendant to vacate such a judgment constituted a general appearance. The dissenting judge voiced the opinion that,
as the whole proof on defendant's petition went to the question of residence, no such general submission to jurisdiction
had occurred hence the judgment was invalid. Had the question arisen in proceedings begun in a court operating under
the Civil Practice Act, it would seem that there is merit in
such dissenting view for that statute expressly declares that
a judgment entered by any court other than one referred to
therein shall have no force or validity." Other venue provisions appear to have been adopted to suit administrative convenience particularly since they permit suit in either the county
isWilcox v. Conklin, 255 Ill.604, 99 N. E. 669 (1912).
19 Toledo, W. & W. Ry. Co. v. Reynolds, 72 Ill. 487 (1874).
20 Reid v. Morton, 119 Ill.
118, 6 N. E. 414 (1886).
21 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 37, §423.
22 Ibid., Ch. 110, §174(5).
- Since 1940 such provision has been incorporated in Rule 75 of that court:
Municipal Court Manual, p. 50.
24 320 Ill. App. 99, 49 N. E. (2d) 817 (1943). Burke, P. J., wrote a dissenting
opinion in which he raised the question as to the application of the holding in
Werner v. Illinois Central R. Co., 379 Ill. 559, 42 N. E. (2d) 82 (1942), to the Municipal Court of Chicago.
25 Ill.Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, §174(5).

CHICAGO-KENT

LAW REVIEW

of the defendant's residence or in any county "in which the
transaction or some part thereof occurred out of which the
cause of action arose."2 As the court, in LaHam v. Sterling
Canning Company," could see no convenience being served
by a suit in a county in which only mere incidental events occurred it ordered the proceeding dismissed for lack of proper
venue. By so doing, it emphasized the fact that the "transaction" or "part thereof" referred to in such statute must
be the one upon which the action is based or out of which the
dispute arose.
Jurisdiction may be acquired over a non-resident motorist who uses the highways of this state in the fashion prescribed by Section 20a of the Motor Vehicles Act.28 It should
be noticed, however, that the act applies only to cases involving the use and operation of motor vehicles "over the highways" of the state. With that limitation in mind, the court in
Brauer Machine & Supply Company v. Parkhill Truck Companry" decided that nothing short of actual personal service
would suffice to support jurisdiction when the unloading of the
non-resident's automobile caused personal injury after it had
come to rest on private property within the state. The fact
that such car had traversed the highways in order to reach
its destination was regarded as insufficient to support service
of summons on the Secretary of State as agent for the nonresident. The benefit of the statute, then, can be claimed only
when the injury is produced during the actual use of the
highway. Notice should also be taken of the decision in Pergl
v. U. S. Axle Company" which gave clarification to the problem of the right to serve process on a foreign corporation
found "doing business" in this state. An earlier Illinois holding on the subject 3I has been substantially modified.
Choice of tribunal and manner of acquiring jurisdiction
26 Ibid., §131.
27 321 Ill. App. 32, 52 N. E. (2d) 467 (1943), noted in 22 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REVIEW 208.
28 Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 951/2, §23.
2 383 Ill. 569, 50 N.E. (2d)
836 (1943), noted in 22 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REVIEW 207 and 42 Mich. L. Rev. 714, affirming 318 Ill.
App. 56, 47 N. E. (2d)
521 (1943).
2o320 Ill.App. 115, 50 N. E. (2d) 115 (1943), noted in 22 CHICAGO-KENT
LAW REVIEW 157, and also noted ante, p. 7.
21 The Thomas Mfg. Co. v. Thede, 186 I1. App. 248 (1914).
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over the defendant being determined, the practitioner must
next observe that his action is instituted in apt time. Of unusual significance in that regard is the Appellate Court decision in Gangloff v. Apfelbach 2 which adopts, for the first time
in this state, the rule that the statute of limitations begins
to run, in malpractice cases against surgeons, from the time
when the operation is negligently performed rather than from
the time when treatment ceases, even though the patient is
not aware of the malpractice until long after the event, so long
as no fraud is practiced.3 While a cause of action for breach
of warranty of title to land does not arise until the grantee
is actually evicted, 34 that analogy will not serve, according to
Lives v. Nationial Mineral Company," in suits to recover damages for breach of warranty of the right to make uninterrupted use of patented machines. Contracts of that nature
were there deemed broken from the moment when the warrantee is enjoined, even by temporary injunction, from the use
of such machines despite the fact that finding of infringement does not come until much later.
Next in order would probably be a determination of the
point as to just who should sue as plaintiff. An interesting
point on that score was made in People ex rel. City of Chicago
V. Schreiber6 dealing with the right of a taxpayer to bring
suit on behalf of a municipal corporation. The court held that,
even though the taxpayer had begun his action first, he could
not assume to exercise the functions of the city law officials
in conducting litigation to enforce municipal rights if such
officials evidenced a purpose to bring suit in the name of the
city and did, in fact, do so. Analogy to preliminary steps
necessary to sustain representative suits by shareholders in
private corporation matters is evident.
Decisions of the Illinois Supreme Court since the outcome
of the case of Hansberry v. Le&7 dealing with the problem of
the right of a single plaintiff to maintain a representative
32319 fll. App. 596, 49 N. E. (2d) 795 (1943), noted in 38 ll. L. Rev. 323.
33 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 83, §23.
- Scott v. Kirkendall, 88 Ill. 465, 30 Am. Rep. 562 (1878).
85 142 F. (2d) 315 (1944).
.6 322 Ill. App. 452, 54 N. E. (2d) 862 (1944), noted post, p. 79.
87 311 U. S. 32, 61 S. Ct. 115, 85 L. Ed. 22, 132 A. L. R. 741 (1940).
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class suit 8 reflect a nervous apprehension on the part of that
court that constitutional rights will be invaded unless all parties can, in some way, be brought before the court. Such reluctance to act seems also evidenced by the holding in Newberry Library v. Board of Education39 where a holder of bonds
was denied the right to sue, for himself and as a representative of other holders of the same issue, to compel payment
thereof even though the same objection was being made by
defendant as to all such bonds. As the several holders were
said to have acquired the bonds at different times and by in,dependent purchases, it was decided they did not constitute a
common class which could be represented in that fashion.
Although Section 22 of the Civil Practice Act 40 specifically sanctions the right of an assignee of a chose in action to
sue in his own name, it does not purport to destroy the fundamental distinctions which exist between a total, or legal assignment and a partial, or equitable one. 41 The assignee, when
suing, should observe such distinctions in order that his proceeding be instituted in the proper forum for intrinsic differences between legal and equitable remedies are still preserved.2
If the person claiming to be assignee has nothing more than
a power of attorney to collect the chose in action, he should
also remember that suit can properly proceed only in the name
of the principal.4 3 Wholesome observance of these principles
should have dictated reversal of the judgment in Standard
Discount Company v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Companywherein a partial assignee was permitted to recover in its own
name through proceedings brought in the Municipal Court of
Chicago.4 5 Support for the holding was said to rest in the
-38 See Peoples Store of Roseland v. McKibbin, 379 Ill. 148, 39 N. E. (2d) 995
(1942), noted in 21 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 23; Otto v. Alexander, 383
Ill. 482, 50 N. E. (2d) 511 (1943). See also Flanagan v. City of Chicago, 311 I1.
App. 135, 35 N. E. (2d) 545 (1941).
39387 Ill. 85, 55 N. E. (2d) 147 (1944), noted post, p. 82.
40 l1. Rev. stat. 1943, Ch. 110, §146.
42 Compare Ball v. Chadwick, 46 Ill. 28 (1867), with Safford v. Miller, 59 InI.
205 (1871).
42 Il. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, §259.10.
- See cases cited in 22 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 269 at 274, footnote 30.
-4321 Ill. App. 220, 53 N. E. (2d) 27 (1944), noted in 22 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REVIEW 269, et seq.
45 That court lacks equitable jurisdiction in the true sense of the term: fll. Rev.
Stat. 1943, Ch. 37, §357.
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fact that the debtor had, subsequent to the assignment, paid
part of the claim to the assignor leaving due an unpaid balance equal to the portion which had been transferred to the
assignee. It is a little difficult, however, to see how a purely
equitable assignment could become converted into a legal one
by some act of the debtor short of novation.
Pensions granted under the Blind Relief Act,46 however,
have finally been held to be non-assignable, either in fact or
by operation of law. The right being exclusively personal,
according to Creighton v. Pope County,4 7 any action must
necessarily abate with the death of the recipient of the public
charity and will not be revived by reason of any statute."
The holding in Proffitt v. ChristianCounty"9 was distinguished
on the ground that the action there maintained was brought
and completed by the pensioner in his lifetime.
Selection of the appropriate remedy may require attention. Although no change has occurred with reference to legal
actions, some decisions regarding proceedings in equity merit
notice. The likelihood of a multiplicity of actions at law has
long been regarded as a basis for invoking equitable jurisdiction ° especially where the claim of the plaintiff rests upon a
series of insurance policies issued by different defendants each
51
containing a provision for prorating the aggregate loss.
Nothing derogatory to that basis for equitable jurisdiction
was found to exist in Jay-Bee Realty Corporation v. Agricultural Insurance Company" despite the argument that the
joinder provisions of the Civil Practice Act,13 which permit the
presentation of separate demands against several defendants
even in law actions, made application to equity unnecessary.
Since Rule 10 of the Illinois Supreme Court 4 declares that all
46

Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 23, §279 et seq.

47 386 Ill. 468, 54 N. E. (2d) 543 (1944), modifying 320 Ill. App. 256, 50 N. E.
(2d) 984 (1943).
48 ll. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 1, §10, is expressly limited to causes which would
survive.
49 370 Il. 530, 19 N. E. (2d) 345 (1939).
50 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, 5th Ed., §245.
5i Weininger v. Metropolitan Fire Ins. Co., 359 Ill. 584, 195 N. E. 420, 98 A. L. R.
169 (1935).
52320 Ill. App. 310, 50 N. E. (2d) 973 (1943), noted in 42 Mich. L. Rev. 945.
Leave to appeal has been denied.
53 I1. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, §148.
54 Ibid., §259.10.
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matters which were cognizable in equity prior to 1934 are
still to be treated as such, it was held that only an express
statute abrogating the jurisdiction previously exercised in
equity could operate to destroy the power of that court to
hear cases of the nature therein involved. Passing mention
should also be made of the opinion of the Illinois Supreme
Court in Ames v. Schlaeger" in which the jurisdiction of
equity to restrain the levy, extension or collection of taxes is
discussed at length.
The Appellate Court, in Adams v. Rakmwski gave considerable attention to the enforcement of equitable decrees by contempt process. A decree had been entered therein finding that
defendants had received money and securities as trustees ex
maleficio and directing that a certain sum with interest be
paid to plaintiffs. Defendants failed to make the payment so
plaintiffs filed a petition for a rule to show cause why the defendants should not be held in contempt of court. The rule
issued and the defendants answered relying for excuse upon
their financial inability to pay the sum demanded. The chancellor, after requiring the transfer by the defendants of certain property which was later found to be worthless, ordered
the rule discharged upon the ground that defendants' failure
to comply with the decree was not contumacious in view of
their inability to comply. Such decision was reversed by the
Appellate Court. That court admitted the general rule to be
that "in proceedings to punish one as for civil contempt for
failure to carry out the directions of a decree to pay money or
deliver up property, proof that the disobedience to the decree
has not been wilful but was due solely to the pecuniary inability or other misfortune of the accused, not resulting from
his fraudulent conduct to produce that condition, will purge
him of the contempt." 7 It was decided, however, that this rule
was inapplicable to a situation wherein defendants have had
possession of money or property committed to their care for
others and have wrongfully disposed of it. 8 It was further
held that the constitutional provision against imprisonment
55 386 fl.

160, 53 N. E. (2d) 937 (1944).
5 319 Ill. App. 556, 49 N. E. (2d) 733 (1943).
57 319 Ill. App. 556 at 560-1, 49 N. E. (2d) 733 at 735.
5sTudor v. Firebaugh, 364 l. 283, 4 N. E. (2d) 393 (1936).
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for debt did not apply, since the obligation of the defendants
was not that arising out of a mere civil judgment for money.
It was added, however, that the court committing a contemner
had jurisdiction to consider a petition for discharge because
of inability to carry out the order of the court."
Brief mention might also be given to City of Kankakee V.
Lang" where a decree was entered in an injunction suit brought
by a municipality requiring the defendant to repair a building
to comply with certain city ordinances. At the close of the decree appeared the following: "O.K.; A.W. DeSelm." DeSelm
was attorney for and had represented the defendant in the
proceeding. The Appellate Court held this to be a consent decree which could not be reviewed by appeal but had to be set
aside only "by an original bill in the nature of a bill of review."
It is interesting to mark not only the survival, under the Civil
Practice Act, of equity but also of its terminology.
PREPARATION OF PLEADINGS

Nothing significant has developed with regard to the statement of the plaintiff's case in the complaint except for the
suggestion in the case of Petta v. Pettal1 that it would be
erroneous to couple issues concerning the property rights of
the spouses with a complaint for separate maintenance. No
dispute is advanced as to the holding therein that a court hearing separate maintenance proceedings would lack jurisdiction
to settle property rights for the statute creating that remedy
definitely restricts the court to quesions of temporary or permanent allowance for support.2 The liberal provisions of the
Civil Practice Act, however, seem to authorize the combination of any number of claims between the parties" if presented as separate demands," so the language of that opinion
might be open to criticism on the ground that it tends to
minimize the effect of such joinder provisions unduly.
For that matter, little has been developed with regard to
defensive pleadings. The answer may, if the defendant so de51 People ex rel. Meier v. Lewe, 380 Ill. 531, 44 N. E. (2d) 551 (1942).
o 323 Ill. App. 14, 54 N. E. (2d) 605 (1944). Leave to appeal has been denied.
61 321 Ill. App. 512, 53 N. E. (2d) 324 (1944), noted in 22 CHICAGO-KENT
LAW REVIEW 281.
62Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 68, §22.
6Ibid., Ch. 110, §168(1).
-Ibid., Ch. 110, §167(1).
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sires, contain a counterclaim,6 5 but that counterclaim must,
according to Biedler v. Malz," be based on a claim that is due
and owing to the defendant at the time plaintiff institutes his
suit for the rule still adheres, in law actions, that all matters
between the parties must be determined as of that date. 7
Damages caused by the improper suing out of a writ of attachment were, consequently, excluded from a counterclaim filed
therein since the injury necessarily arose after the time when
plaintiff began his suit. While the statute directs that the
counterclaim may generally be stated without regard to
whether or not the same presents a related or wholly distinct
demand from that stated in the plaintiff's complaint,"5 that
section was held inapplicable, in Sauvage v. Oscar W. Hedstrom Corporation," to forcible entry and detainer proceedinks so that a counterclaim filed therein was held properly
dismissed."0 Such practice would have been admittedly erroneous prior to the adoption of the Civil Practice Act 71 but it was
urged that the breadth of the present counterclaim provisions
had nullified the effect of earlier decisions. While it is true
that certain types of statutory proceedings are exempted from
the operation of the procedural rules laid down in the Civil
Practice Act,72 still a clause of the Forcible Entry and Detainer
Act assimilates the practice in cases thereunder to that of
other civil proceedings. 8 It has been held that the provisions
of the practice statute with respect to summary proceedings
applied to such cases, 74 so it is somewhat strained to say that
the counterclaim provisions are inapplicable simply because
heretofore the only issue which could be advanced in such a
case was one concerning the right to possession of the leased
premises. Such a holding would seem especially harsh where,
-5 Ibid., Ch. 110, §162.
06 323 Ill.App. 265, 55 N. E.

(2d) 300 (1944).
Kelly v. Garrett, 6 Ill. (1 Gil.) 649 (1844).
-8 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, §162.
09 322 Ill. App. 427, 54 N. E. (2d) 725 (1944).
7o Although the case arose in the Municipal Court of Chicago, so not technically under the Civil Practice Act, its Rule 33 is similar to Section 38
thereof: Municipal Court Manual, pp. 22-3.
71 Truman v. Rodesch, 168 Ill. App. 304 (1912).
72Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, §155(2).
73 Ibid., Ch. 57, §11.
74 First Nat. Bank of Chicago v. Bohnhorst, 305 Ill. App. 251, 27 N. E. (2d)
319 (1940); Wainscott v. Penikoff, 287 Ill. App. 78, 4 N. E. (2d) 511 (1936).
67
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as in the Sauvage case, the reason for the non-payment of
the rent reserved was the tenant's claim to credit for moneys
allegedly due because of the lessor's use of a portion of the
demised premises.
If a counterclaim or other affirmative matter appears in
an answer, a reply by plaintiff becomes necessary 75 and if not
filed in time 16 may lead to default with the consequent admission of the correctness of the opponent's allegations 7 If,
however, the person failing to act in appropriate time petitions
for permission to cure the defect before default has been
taken, the trial court should grant leave so to do, according
to the holding in Snively v. Crownover,8 where judgment was
reversed because plaintiff was denied the right to make a late
filing of a reply. Liberality on this point was deemed proper
in the furtherance of justice. When drafting the reply, however, due caution should be given to the rules of pleading. In
that regard, the first clear expression on the subject of departure since the adoption of the Civil Practice Act was
handed down in Spence v. Washington National Insurance
Company" where plaintiff's reply, really unnecessary because
no new matter appeared in the answer, deviated from the
theory of the complaint and was construed to be a violation
of the rules of good pleading. As under the former practice,
the pleader who realizes that he cannot sustain his case on
the theory first advanced in the complaint should take advantage of the liberal provisions for the amendment thereof
rather than try to save his case through a reply.
Motions to strike pleadings or to dismiss suits, whether
°
made under Section 45 or Section 48 of the Civil Practice Act,
are intrinsically demurrers so the issues raised thereby must
be confined to matters already on the face of the record or
which can properly be brought within the compass thereof by
affidavit. Lack of power on the part of a trustee to make the
contract sued upon is matter which is not so apparent on the
fll. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, §156.
Ibid., §259.8.
77 Ibid., §164(2).
78321 Ill. App. 292, 53 N. E. (2d) 7 (1944).
79320 Ill. App. 149, 50 N. E. (2d) 128 (1943), noted in 22 CHICAGO-KENT
LAW REVIEW 146.
8o Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, § § 169 and 172.
75

76
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record, hence, according to the decision in City National Bank
and Trust Company of Chicago v. Bairstow,8 1 that issue may
only be raised by affirmative pleading in the fashion directed
by Section 43 (4) of the act I and cannot be made the basis
83
of a motion to strike.
THE TRIAL OF THE CASE

Except for one case, the rules of evidence were applied
without producing any occasion for comment. In Noel State
Bank v. Blakely Real Estate Improvement CorporationI the
presumption that public records possess absolute verity, hence
cannot be impeached, was relied on as the basis for holding
a master in chancery liable to account for moneys which he
reported he had received but which, in fact, had never been
turned over to him. The majority of the court declared that
a sound public policy forbade that he should be permitted
to escape the consequences of his act-by repudiating and contradicting his official report, although the court was careful
to note that the misstatement therein was not actuated by
any motive to procure advantage for the master or with a
desire to produce injury to others.
Unnecessary repetition in instructions given on behalf of
a plaintiff in a personal injury case, so as to place undue emphasis on the kind of injuries suffered by plaintiff and their
bearing on the measure of damage, was condemned in O'Hara
v. Central Illinois Light Company85 where, out of ten instruc-.
tions given at the request of plaintiff, four of them contained
almost identical language on that point. Though the court
recognized that some latitude should be allowed so that the
81 319

ll. App. 632, 50 N. E. (2d) 111 (1943).

Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, §167(4).
83 A distinction should be drawn between the situation there presented and
the one covered by Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, §172(lc). The latter deals
with plaintiff's incapacity to sue as by reason of his alienage, etc.
-Sub nom. Cuzzone v. Cohen, 321 Ill. App. 594, 53 N. E. (2d) 621 (1944).
O'Connor, P. J., wrote a dissenting opinion. Leave to appeal has been denied.
The dissenting judge predicated his opinion on the fact that it was common
knowledge that masters in chancery, when conducting foreclosure sales, rarely
receive cash for the amount of the bid made by the mortgagee since it would
be foolish to compel the mortgagee to deposit the full cash amount of his bid
only to receive the return thereof, less costs, a day or so later. He therefore
believed that the realities of the situation, rather than technicalities, should be
the basis of any decision on the question of the master's duty to account for
sums supposedly received.
85 319 Ill. App. 336, 49 N. E. (2d) 274 (1943), noted in 42 Mich. L. Rev. 536.
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instructions might cover every phase of a damage claim, it
could find no justification in such frequent repetition and concluded that the same constituted reversible error.
A person seeking to obtain a directed verdict under the
former practice was obliged not only to present a motion to
that effect but also was required to submit a proposed form
of instruction for use in case such motion was granted. If
no such instruction was submitted, there was no legal issue
before the court to be determined.8 6 It was urged, in Compass
Sales Corporation v. National Mineral Company, 7 that such
requirement still continued so that it was error to grant defendant's motion for a directed verdict inasmuch as the same
was not accompanied by the proper written instruction. The
court nevertheless approved the action of the trial court in
sustaining such motion when it observed that the new procedure laid down under Section 68 (3a) of the Civil Practice
Act 88 in practical effect converts such motion into one for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict if ruling thereon is reserved by the trial court until after verdict has been received. The court did note, however, that it was better practice to present a written instruction with the motion for a
directed verdict so that the same might be used if the trial
court should decide to pass thereon before submitting the
case to the jury.
Under the earlier procedure in equity a motion by defendant to dismiss the bill of complaint for want of equity amounted
to a submission of the cause to the chancellor and precluded
further testimony."' By the 1941 amendment to the Civil Practice Act 9o the defendant was permitted, if such motion was
denied, to adduce evidence in support of his defense and
the right of the chancellor to open the case for further testimony was recognized. It is now indicated, by the decision in
8 that the same rules will apply to a hearing
Havill v. Darch,
86 See West Chicago St. R. R. Co. v. Foster, 175 Ill. 396, 51 N. E. 690 (1898).
87 321 111. App. 522, 53 N. E. (2d) 319 (1944).
ss ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, §192(3a).
89 Abel v. Flesher, 296 Ill. 604, 130 N. E. 353 (1921); Thorworth v. Scheets,
269 Ill. 573, 110 N. E. 42 (1915); Koebel v. Doyle, 256 Ill. 610, 100 N. E. 154
(1912).
See also
9oLaws, 1941, Vol. 2, p. 466; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Oh. 110, §188(4).
Brelsford v. Community High School Dist., 328 Ill. 27, 159 N. E. 237 (1927).
91 320 Ill. App. 667, 52 N. E. (2d) 64 (1943). Leave to appeal has been denied.
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before a master in chancery, even though the latter is but a
ministerial officer, since his action is open to review by the
chancellor upon exceptions taken thereto.
Motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict 92 have
long been used in law actions where the practice is limited
to granting such motions only if the trial court can say that,
taking the evidence in the record as true and rejecting all contradictory circumstances, there is no reasonable basis to sustain the verdict. When ruling on such motion, the trial court
is not authorized to weigh the evidence or to determine controverted questions of fact.2 A similar procedure has been
devised for use in equity cases tried with a jury, but where
that jury is to serve merely in an advisory capacity the chancellor is free to accept or reject the verdict as he believes
justice may require." For that reason, it was held in Shipman v. Mosely, 5 that Rule 22 of the Illinois Supreme Court 11
does not limit the chancellor to the consideration merely of
the evidence which would tend to sustain the verdict but
rather that he is free, upon such motion, to exercise his own
independent judgment on the whole of the evidence.
Circuity of procedure on post-trial motions was struck
down by Rule 22 of the Illinois Supreme Court which was so
designed as to give the appellate tribunal the benefit of the
views of the trial judge, at the time of his ruling on both the
motion in arrest of judgment and the motion for new trial,
so that the reviewing court might, at one time, dispose of
all disputed issues thus raised. That rule, however, concludes
with the statement that "any party who fails to file a motion
for a new trial as herein provided shall be deemed to have
waived the right to apply for a new trial." Application of
that proviso became necessary in Todd v. S. S. Kresge Company 97 when the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court
had erred in granting defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and, as no motion for new trial had
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, § 192(3).
93 Ibid., §259.22.
94 Oswald v. Newbanks, 336 Ii1. 490, 168 N. E. 340 (1929).
95 319 Ill. App. 443, 49 N. E. (2d) 662 (1943).
96 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, §259.22.
97 384 Il. 524, 52 N. E. (2d) 206 (1944), reversing 317 Ill. App. 536, 47 N. E.
(2d) 138 (1943).
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been made, the court found it necessary to enter judgment on
the verdict.
Two cases have bearing on the nature of the judgment
which should be pronounced. The action of the Illinois Supreme Court in affirming the judgment of the Appellate Court
in Shaw V. Courtney 98 should not be construed to sanction
the practice of taking separate judgments for varying amounts
against joint tort feasors,9 9 for the higher court was careful
to state that its decision was to be confined to the precise questions presented to it. Section 50 of the Civil Practice Act'
does permit the entry of more than one judgment in a given
case, so that a person may not be delayed in his remedy
against one party while litigating issues involving another,
but that statute has not changed the rule that if a unit judgment is rendered it must be reversed as to all if erroneous as
to some.2 As a consequence it was held, in Fredrich v. Wolf,3
that a judgment taken by confession on a joint note signed
by two persons, being a unit judgment and erroneous as to one
maker, had to be reversed as to the other. By so doing, the
surviving maker was thereby rendered incompetent to testify
as to conversations with the deceased maker tending to establish authority to sign as agent for the latter.4 It was also held
that such surviving maker was not rendered any the more
competent because called as an adverse witness under Section
60 of the Civil Practice Act.'
After judgment has been rendered, the trial court may
have occasion to consider whether the same should be vacated,
particularly if the same was taken by confession. Such judgments may be vacated by the trial court upon motion disclosing a prima facie defense on the merits to the whole or to a
part of the plaintiff's demand.' In the past, however, it has
98 385 Ill. 559, 53 N. E. (2d) 432 (1944), affirming 317 Ill. App. 422, 46 N. E.
(2d) 170 (1943), noted in 21 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 249.
99 That practice was criticized in a note on the decision of the Appellate
Court which appeared in 21 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 249.
1 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, §174.
2 The former practice is illustrated by Claflin v. Dunne, 129 Ill. 241, 21 N. E.
834 (1889).
3 383 Ill. 638, 50 N. E. (2d) 755 (1943), reversing 316 Ill. App. 672, 45 N. E.
(2d) 551 (1942). Wilson, J., dissented.
'Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 51, §2.
5 Ibid., Ch. 110, §184.
a Ibid., Ch. 110, §259.26.
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been held no reason to vacate such judgment merely because
the judgment debtor possessed a counterclaim which he desired to assert.' Strict construction of existing statutes would
lead to much the same result for it can hardly be said that
a counterclaim growing out of some unrelated transaction constitutes a defense "on the merits" to plaintiff's demand. Liberal
construction thereof, however, as dictated by express statutory command,8 was given in State Bank of Blue Island v.
Kott I so that the judgment debtor was held entitled to have
a judgment by confession vacated, without any defense to the
claim on the judgment note, merely because he asserted ownership of a claim against the plaintiff growing out of an entirely
independent and unrelated transaction.
Other judgments become final thirty days after rendition
so that the trial court lacks jurisdiction to set the same aside
except in the fashion permitted by Section 72 of the Civil
Practice Act.10 Views expressed by the dissenting judge in
Jerome v. 5019-21 Quincy Street Building Corporation,"to the
effect that the motion there provided should be limited to cure
defects not apparent on the face of the record and cannot reach
obvious errors, were approved by the Illinois Supreme Court
when it took the case on leave to appeal and reversed the
holding of the majority of the Appellate Court.1 2 Practice
under the new provision must, therefore, be assimilated with
that which formerly prevailed. 13 If the legislature contemplated any change in the law by substituting the newer motion for the older writ, that change has now been minimized
to one of terminology only for the motion has been declared
unavailable for use in equity proceedings 1" and apparently
possesses no broader scope at law than did the old writ. It
7Stead v. Craine, 256 Ill. App. 445

(1930).
sll. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, §128.
9 323 Ill. App. 27, 54 N. E. (2d) 897 (1944).
lo Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, §196.
il 317 Ill. App. 335, 45 N. E. (2d) 878 (1943).
12 Jerome v. 5019-21 Quincy Street Bldg. Corp., 385 Ill. 524, 53 N. E. (2d) 444
(1944), reversing 317 Ill. App. 335, 45 N. E. (2d) 878 (1943).
23 See Chapman v. North American Life Ins. Co., 292 Ill. 179, 126 N. E. 732
(1920).
14 Frank v. Salomon, 376 Ill. 439, 34 N. E. (2d) 424 (1941), noted in 19 CHI-
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might be expected, therefore, that the confusion generated by
the change should now subside.15
APPEAL AND APPELLATE PROCEDURE

Review of trial court decisions may produce questions of
jurisdiction for the higher courts of the state must move
within constitutional and statutory limits. Of foremost significance, therefore, is the well-considered opinion written by
Justice Wilson of the Illinois Supreme Court in the case of
Superior Coal Company v. O'Brien'" which gives exhaustive
treatment to the question of the power of reviewing courts
over nisi prius decisions on certiorari directed to test the
correctness of findings by administrative bodies. That opinion
declares that review of such nisi prius decisions is possible,
even in the absence of statutory language authorizing the
same," whether such review takes the form of an appeal or
a writ of error, since nothing short of a mandatory prohibition
against further review can operate to deny the power of the
higher courts of this state to pass on the work done by the
inferior tribunals. A similar holding as to review of determinations in lunacy proceedings may be found in the case of
In re Cash.8
The reported holding in In re Petition of Ekendahl91
should serve to explode a common notion-that there is no right
to seek review of a decree of adoption 10 but that all questions
concerning the validity thereof must be tested by habeas corpus proceedings.2 1 It was there held that although the Adop'5 The rather unique decision in Nikola v. Campus Towers Apt. Bldg. Corp.,
303 Ill. App. 516, 25 N. E. (2d) 582 (1940), which translated such a motion into
a complaint in equity, will probably go without explanation.
16 383 Ill. 394, 50 N. E. (2d) 453 (1943).
17 The statute there involved, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 120, §451, now permits
appeal direct to the Supreme Court, but the amendment added by Laws 1943,
Vol. I, p. 1131, was not applicable to the facts of the instant case.
is 383 fI1. 409, 50 N. E. (2d) 487 (1943), affirming 313 Ill. App. 281, 40 N. E.
(2d) 312 (1942). Smith, J., wrote a dissenting opinion on another issue of the
case. It should be noted that the present Mental Health Act, Ill. Rev. Stat.
1943, Ch. 91'/2, §24, expressly covers the right of appeal.
19321 Ill. App. 457, 53 N. E. (2d) 302 (1944), noted in 39 Ill. L. Rev. 88.
Leave to appeal has been granted.
20 That notion proceeds from the decision in Meyers v. Meyers, 32 fli. App.
189 (1889).
21 Sullivan v. People, 224 Ill. 468, 79 N. E. 695 (1906).
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tion Act is silent as to any method of review and specifically
declares that the appellate provisions of the Civil Practice Act
do not apply to adoption proceedings," still review by writ of
error was possible as in the case of other statutory proceedings wherein the use of the writ of error is not expressly for'
bidden. Defects which could not be reached by habeas corpus
proceedings 22 were there deemed open to consideration by the
appellate tribunal. Improvident use of a notice of appeal rather
than a writ of error was overlooked because of the liberality
displayed in Rule 28 of the Illinois Supreme Court. 4
Review is not usually possible, however, unless the decision of the trial court is one possessing finality for until that
time the lower court is in a position to remedy its own errors.2 5
Construction of the term "final order," therefore, became necessary in Brauer Machine & Supply Company v. Parkhill
Truck Company 26 where the trial court had sustained a motion to quash the service of process upon a finding that the
defendant was a non-resident corporation not doing business
in Illinois. It was urged that such order was neither a final
one nor an interlocutory one within the scope of Sections 77
and 78 of the Civil Practice Act 27 so that appellate review
was not possible. Although the court recognized that the
essence of finality usually involves a determination of material
issues on the merits, it concluded that a stalemate would result if no opportunity was provided for re-examination of an
erroneous decision on such a point and it therefore treated
the same as a final order even though no judgment had been
entered dismissing the suit.
Principles laid down in Borman v. Oetzell 28 received a
logical.extension through the decision in Phillips v. O'Connell2 9
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 4, §13.
Only issues as to the jurisdiction of the court
tested in that form of remedy: Ashlock v. Ashlock,
(1935).
24 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, §259.28.
25 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, §201.
26 383 Ill. 569, 50 N. E. (2d) 836 (1943), noted in
REVIEW 207 and 42 Mich. L. Rev. 714, affirming
(2d) 521 (1943).
27 fll. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, §§201-2.
28 382 Ill. 110, 46 N. E. (2d) 914 (1943), noted in
REVIEW 332.
29322 Ill. App. 164, 54 N. E. (2d) 84 (1944).
22

23

granting adoption could be
360 Ill. 115, 195 N. E. 657

22 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
318 Il. App. 56, 47 N. E.
21 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
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where it was held that although the Civil Practice Act permits
the joinder of legal and equitable claims and also sanctions
separate judgments thereon,"0 still no final order will exist
as to one part of the case if the court should decide that
eventual disposition of the entire claim should await the outcome of the hearing on the other portion. The case is noteworthy because plaintiff could have accomplished his entire
purpose, i. e. foreclosure and recovery of a deficiency judgment, in one equitable proceeding 3 1 but instead chose to include a count at law on the note. If his claim had been single,
an order denying him a deficiency judgment would have constituted a final and appealable order, 2 but because he had incorporated a separate claim at law for the same thing it was
held that the decision denying a deficiency judgment in equity
and remitting him to a hearing on the legal cause of action
was not a final determination on the merits. Any hardship
in such holding was said to result from plaintiff's voluntary
action in joining the claims.
The extent of jurisdiction to review the action of a trial
court upon a motion for new trial was considerably expanded
by Section 77 of the Civil Practice Act 88 which now authorizes such review in case a motion of that nature is granted
whether at the request of plaintiff or defendant. Such appeal
so provided, however, is not a matter of right, as is the case
with true final orders, for leave to appeal must first be obtained from the reviewing court or some judge thereof.
8
Further limitation thereon is noted in Baumgardnerv. Boyer ,
in which the Illinois Supreme Court declared that no other
review is possible than that permitted by the statute despite
the contention that due process of law would be denied to a
litigant if the reviewing court should refuse to grant permission to appeal from an order granting a new trial. 35 An attempt to accomplish the same objective by indirection was
s 0IU. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, §§168 and 174(1).
a, Ibid., Ch. 95, §17.
32 See Hartman v. Pistorius, 248 Ill. 568, 94 N. E. 131 (1911).
38 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, §201. See also Rule 30 of the Illinois Supreme
Court: Ibid., Ch. 110, §259.30.
-4384 Ill. 584, 52 N. E. (2d) 247 (1944).
35 It might be noticed that allowance of an appeal is not a requisite of due
process: People ex rel. Radium Dial Co. v. Ryan, 371 ll. 597, 21 N. E. (2d) 749
(1939).
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likewise frustrated in Goodrich V. Sprague3 6 where the court
criticized an effort to procure review by the Supreme Court
of the action taken by the Appellate Court when passing on
an appeal from an order granting a new trial. 7
Notice of appeal is necessary to give jurisdiction to the
appellate tribunal. The statute also requires that a copy of
such notice be served on the opposing party " and proof of
service be made within a limited time thereafter. The filing
of a duplicate copy of the notice of appeal, bearing suitable
endorsement showing the manner of service, on a day subsequent to that on which the notice of appeal itself was filed
does not, according to Deibler v. Bernard Brothers, Incorporated3 9 amount to the taking of two appeals from the same
decision 40 but rather that such endorsed form merely supplements the original notice. As the notice of appeal must be
filed within the time limited by law, questions are likely to
arise as to the point when time begins to run. On that score,
the action taken in Snook v. Shaw,41 dealing with the question
of the finality of an oral declaration by a chancellor of his
decision so as to set the period for appeal running, has been
re-enforced by the decision in Woods v. Old National Bank of
Centralia" which holds that not even the judge's minutes of
a decision on the merits constitute a final order, particularly
if such minutes show that a formal written decree was to be
prepared and submitted for signature. Until such decree was
entered, there was always the possibility that the chancellor
might revise or entirely change his decision if the equities of
the case required it.
3G385 Ill. 200, 52 N. E. (2d) 250 (1944).
87 Attention is invited to a still more recent holding, not in the period of this
survey, which points out the only way by which final review by the Supreme
Court would be possible under existing statutes: Kavanaugh v. Washburn, 387
Ill. 204, 56 N. E. (2d) 420 (1944).
38

Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, §259.34.

39 385 fll. 610, 53 N. E. (2d) 450 (1944), affirming 319 Ill. App. 504, 48 N. E.
(2d) 422 (1943).
40 Two separate appeals in fact by the same party would be improper: Spivey
Bldg. Corporation v. Illinois Iowa Power Co., 375 Ill. 128, 30 N. E. (2d) 641
(1940), noted in 19 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 274.
41 315 Ill. App. 594, 43 N. E. (2d) 417 (1942), noted in 21 CtICAGO-KENT
LAW REVIEW 98.

42 322 Ill. App. 1, 53 N. E. (2d) 734 (1944).
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After proper notice of appeal has been filed, however,
jurisdiction over the cause attaches to the reviewing court
and, since a case cannot be before the trial and the appellate
tribunal at the same time, the trial court is necessarily ousted
of its jurisdiction. The latter cannot, by attempted reservation of jurisdiction over undisposed of matters, enter any
other or further orders even though no bond has been filed so
as to make the appeal operate as a supersedeas.4 3 For such
reason, a supplemental decree taxing costs was reversed in
Cowdery v. Northern Trust Company 44 on the ground that it
was an absolute nullity.
Procedural matters after an appeal has been taken are
regulated principally by rule of court. One such rule declares
that "each party shall file a printed brief" in every case
brought up on appeal." That rule should not be given too
literal a meaning, according to McKey v. McKean," just because an appeal is taken on behalf of a number of persons.
Separate briefs are not only to be regarded as unnecessary
but the filing thereof is subject to condemnation. The court
did note, however, that if separate or conflicting issues are
involved and such questions cannot be properly presented in
one brief then, on motion, permission will be granted for the
use of separate briefs.
ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS

Significant law has been made during the past year with
regard to methods by which judgment orders and decrees may
be made enforcible. Of foremost importance is the case of
.Dunham v. Kauffman 47 in which a distinct setback was given
to proponents of the claim that the legislature, when amending the Attachments Act in 1935,41 by inference authorized
the use of an equitable attachment. The higher court declared
43ll. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, §206.

44 321 Ill.
App. 243, 53 N. E. (2d) 43 (1944). O'Connor, P. J., wrote a brief
concurring opinion. Leave to appeal has been denied.
451I. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, §259.39.
46 384 Ill.
112, 51 N. E. (2d) 189 (1943).
47 385 Ill.
79, 52 N. E. (2d) 143 (1944), reversing 319 Il. App. 229, 48 N. E.
(2d) 777 (1943), noted in 22 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 80 and 38 Ill.
L. Rev. 408.
48 Laws, 1935, p. 210; Ill.Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 11, §1.
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that, in the absence of express language showing an intent to
create a new remedy, older doctrines would have to prevail"9
particularly since distinctions between actions at law and proceedings in equity have not been abolished." The holding
might well have been the other way for the change by the
legislature would seem to have little significance if it were
not designed to permit equitable attachments.
Rights under successive attachments were involved in
Scleetz v. Crabill51 where the debtor's bank accoimt had first
been attached in favor of one Martens and, while that attachment was in force, the bank honored certain checks including
one designed to satisfy the debt due Martens. Prior to the
time when the Martens attachment proceedings were dismissed, another creditor attached the same fund but was
given judgment against the garnishee only for the net balance remaining in the account. A claim that the bank had
acted improperly in honoring such checks during the pendency
of the first attachment without court order, hence should account for the entire fund,52 was rejected when the court said
that to adopt such theory would in effect force the garnishee
to be a receiver of the debtor's assets responsible to all the
debtor's creditors who might thereafter serve attachment
writs. The protection intended by the statute was said to be
designed solely for the benefit of the first attaching creditor.
The nature of the property which may be subjected to
garnishment proceedings was involved in Kovich v. Live Stock
National Bank of Chicago53 where the judgment creditor
sought to reach funds on deposit in an account in the name
of a person other than that of the judgment debtor on the
ground that the funds deposited therein really belonged to the
debtor. On finding that such claim was true, the court held
garnishment proper for the same was said to be a remedy to
49Phelps v. Foster, 18 Ill. 309 (1857), declared that until the creditor had
exhausted his remedy at law by securing judgment and having execution returned nulZa bona resort to equity was improper.
50 Frank v. Salomon, 376 Ill. 439, 34 N. E. (2d) 424 (1941), noted in 19 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 372.
51 322 Ill. App. 49, 53 N. E. (2d) 741 (1944). Leave to appeal has been
denied.
52 flI. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 11, §21.
53 Sub. nom. Appeal of Keller, 320 Ill. App. 535, 51 N. E. (2d) 806 (1943).
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be administered upon equitable principles. The cash surrender
value of a life insurance policy issued prior to the statute exempting such proceeds from garnishment " was, however, held
exempt in Fidelity Coal Company v. Diamond 1 upon a showing that the policy was not taken out to defraud creditors, as
the statute was said to indicate a definite public policy in that
regard. As the proceeds of such a policy could not be reached
by garnishment, it followed that no better relief could be obtained by a creditor's bill. Shares of stock deposited by a bank
director in order to qualify for office were, on the other hand,
held subject to garnishment by an individual creditor in Mol5 6
ner v. South Chicago Savings Bank.
An interesting question over the rights of a judgment
creditor who also purchased the property siezed at public sale
was presented in Benj. Harris & Company v. Western Smelting & Refining Company5 7 where it developed that a substantial portion of the property had disappeared between garnishment and sale. The court held that the rule of caveat emptor,
which applies to judicial sales, would control so that loss had
to fall on the purchaser. A claim that the provisions of the
Garnishment Act should serve to hold the garnishee to account 58 was rejected since the loss appeared to have preceded
the levy. The creditor in Roseland Cab Company for the use
of Hibley v. Savings Mutual Casualty Company 9 fared better
in a dispute with the garnishee over the question whether the
automobile involved in a traffic accident was the one covered by
the policy. A statement made by the assured in a notice of
accident to the effect that the covered car, rather than another
automobile, was the one involved was held competent evidence
against the garnishee by a majority of the court.
Law on the subject of fraudulent conveyances was made
in Woodham v. Miller ° where the judgment creditor attempted
to avoid a deed made by judgment debtor to his daughter,
-I1.
Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 73, §850.
55 322 Ill. App. 229, 54 N. E. (2d) 240 (1944).
56138 F. (2d) 201 (1943), noted in 22 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 213.
57 322 Ill. App. 609, 54 N. E. (2d) 900 (1944).
-111. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 62, §§20, 24 and 25.
59 320 Ill. App. 363, 51 N. E. (2d) 609 (1943). Burke, P. J., wrote a dissenting
opinion. Leave to appeal has been denied.
o319 I1. App. 388, 49 N. E. (2d) 317 (1943).
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when the court said that the fact that a deed is made to a
near relative does not render the deed presumptively fraudulent although the fact of relationship is a circumstance which
might excite suspicion. The court also had occasion, in DeMartini v. DeMartini,61 to reiterate the proposition that a judgment
is not a lien on property previously conveyed by the judgment
debtor, even though such conveyance was designed to defraud
creditors, for the levy and execution does not operate to cancel
the conveyance. Priority of lien, therefore, was given to one
whose judgment was later in point of time and who executed
the same after decree had been entered avoiding the fraudulent conveyance.
IV. CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
Clarification of the substance of the criminal law of Illinois
was provided through four decisions of sufficient significance to
merit attention. In the first, that of People v. Potter,' it was
claimed that the state had failed to prove a violation of the
statute condemning open lewdness 2 because the testimony
showed that the parties concerned maintained separate domiciles and lived the major portion of the time therein. It was
asserted that the fact that they enjoyed frequent sexual interviews was insufficient to warrant conviction inasmuch as the
statute condemns only the living together "in an open state"
of adultery or fornication. While private immoral indulgence
might not be enough,' the court did find that the acts of the
parties were so brazen and notorious that every neighbor in
the community was cognizant of what went on, hence affirmed
the conviction.
To warrant conviction for manslaughter growing out of
the negligent operation of an automobile, however, it must
appear that the defendant's conduct was not only the proximate cause of the death of the victim but also that such conduct amounted to recklessness.' The fact that the defendant,
at the time, was engaged in the violation of some other statute as, for example, driving without lights, does not neces61385 Ill.
128, 52 N. E. (2d) 138 (1944).
'319 fl1. App. 409, 49 N. E. (2d) 307 (1943).
2Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 38, §46.
3 See discussion of this point in 1 Am. Jur., Adultery, §17.
4 People v. Burgard, 377 Ill. 322, 36 N. E. (2d)
558 (1941).
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sarily prove that his act in so doing amounted to reckless or
wanton driving. 5 When, therefore, a collision occurs because,
shortly before the impact, the lights of defendant's car become
extinguished through mechanical failure of which he has had
no advance warning, and the act of driving continues only for
the purpose of removing the car to a safe place off the highway, it could be expected that the court would, as it did in
People v. Lynn,' conclude that evidence of recklessness was
lacking so as to warrant reversal of a conviction for manslaughter.
The statute making it criminal for any p-erson to "solicit
to prostitution" 7 was questioned, in People v. Rice,8 on the
ground that it did not sufficiently define the offense there condemned or describe the act or acts which constitute the same.
The statute was held sufficiently broad for that purpose asthe terms used therein were said to possess a meaning so well
understood as to require no further definition. The indictment based thereon was, however, held properly quashed since
it was lacking in sufficient particularity to protect the defendant from a subsequent prosecution for the same offense. A
somewhat similar point was made in People v. Friedrich9
wherein criticism was addressed to the statute making it criminal to possess or sell obscene books, pictures, etc., 10 on the
ground that the statute laid down no definition for the terms
"obscene" and "indecent" as used therein. Defendant contended that, in the absence of definition, such words could have
different meanings to different persons so that no man might
know whether the thing he possessed or sold was an object of
vulgarity and indecency or had some cultural value as a work
of art until after he had been tried for a violation of the
statute. It was, nevertheless, adjudged that the statute was
not void for indefiniteness.
Most of the appeals in criminal cases raised issues as to
the correctness of procedural steps taken in securing convicPeople v. Przybyl, 365 Il. 515, 6 N. E. (2d) 848 (1937).
r 385 Ill.
165, 52 N. E. (2d) 166 (1944).
7 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 38, §163.
8 383 111. 584, 50 N. E. (2d) 711 (1943).
9385 ll.175, 52 N. E. (2d) 120 (1944).
10 Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 38, §468.
5
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tions.11 Of cases in this category, the following are deemed
noteworthy and are arranged in the order in which the question involved in each is apt to arise during the course of a
criminal prosecution.
Acquisition of jurisdiction over the person of the offender
is essential to a valid conviction.2 That jurisdiction could not
be obtained merely by attaching a ticket to an illegally parked
automobile directing the owner thereof to appear on a stated
date. But if that action is followed up by the filing of a complaint and the issuance and service of a warrant, jurisdiction
will then attach according to City of Chicago v. Crane is
despite the fact that the defendant might appear specially for
the purpose of questioning the jurisdiction so acquired.
Section 8 of Article II of the Illinois Constitution of 1870
provides that no person shall be held to answer for a criminal
offense unless on indictment of a grand jury but that in case
of punishment by fine or imprisonment otherwise than in the
penitentiary other methods of prosecution may be adopted.
Reliance was placed on that section, in People v. Kobylak,4
as ground for the claim that when the punishment provided by
law adds any additional penalty to the fine or imprisonment in
the manner indicated then the prosecution must be by indictment. It was also argued that inasmuch as Section 47 of the
Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on Highways " directs that,.
in addition to fine or imprisonment, the license of the convicted
violator shall be revoked, no valid proscution could be conducted thereunder in the Municipal Court of Chicago as that
court possesses jurisdiction only in cases where the punishment is limited to fine or imprisonment for a short term. 6 The
fallacy of such argument was exposed when the court declared
11 Cases which only involved problems of the sufficiency of evidence or credibility of testimony to sustain the verdict or judgment are not included in a
survey of this character. They do, however, represent the bulk of the work of
the appellate courts.
12 Ker v. People, 110 Ill. 627 (1884), affirmed in 119 U. S. 436, 7 S. Ct. 225, 30
L. Ed. 421 (1886).
13 319 Ill. App. 623, 49 N. E. (2d) 802 (1943), noted in 22 CHICAGO-KENT
LAW REVIEW 87.
14 383 Ill. 432, 50 N. E. (2d) 465 (1943).
15 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 95%, §144.
16 Ibid., Ch. 37, §357. See also People v. Russell, 245
ll. 268, 91 N. E. 1075
(1910).
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that revocation of the license was an incidental consequence
to the conviction and was not to be considered as punishment
for the offense."
Statutes of limitation require that indictments must be
found within certain fixed periods after the commission of the
offense, 18 but to obtain the benefit thereof it must usually appear that, at all times concerned, the party charged must have
been "usually and publicly resident" within the state.'9 By
attempting to give the technical legal definition to the word
"resident" as referring to a legal domicile in the state, the
defendant in People v. Carmano hoped to be able to sustain
his contention that prosecution was barred even though he
was absent from Illinois for a long period undergoing incarceration in the penitentiary of another state. The conviction was
affirmed, however, when the court concluded that, even though
a man's legal residence could not be changed by involuntary
imprisonment elsewhere, still the term "resident" as used in
the statute in question referred to one publicly and actually
present in the state.
Along similar lines is the problem in People v. Utterback2 1
where the defendant contended that, by reason of a failure
to grant him a speedy trial as required by law,22 the court had
lost jurisdiction over him even though he withdrew his motion for discharge for want of prosecution and pleaded guilty.
Admitting that had his motion been pressed he probably was
entitled to be discharged, the court nevertheless held that
the guarantee of a speedy trial, like the guarantee of trial by
jury, was personal to the defendant hence could be, and was,
waived.2 3
Principles of evidence law particularly applicable to crim17 Similar holdings in State ex rel. Connolly v. Parks, 199 Minn. 622, 273 N. W.
233 (1937), and Commonwealth v. Funk, 323 Pa. 390, 186 A. 65 (1936), were
noticed.
IS Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 38, § §628-31.
19 Id, §632.
20 385 Ill. 23, 52 N. E. (2d) 197 (1943).
21 385 Ill. 239, 52 N. E. (2d) 775 (1944).
22 l1. Const. 1870, Art. I, §9; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 38, §748.
- Statements in People v. Szobor, 360 Ill. 233, 195 N. E. 648 (1935), to the
effect that a court was without jurisdiction to accept a plea or enter judgment

after the expiration of the four-month period fixed by statute, were expressly
overruled.
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inal cases also received consideration. Presumptions designed
to assist the prosecution to establish a prima facie case of
violation of law " are rather rare as the burden of proof in
criminal cases is greater than in civil suits. Such presumptions
will be upheld, though, if the inference drawn is a reasonable
one and the same possesses only prima facie effect.2 Tested
in that light, the presumption declared by a city ordinance to
the effect that whenever an automobile has been parked in violation of law then the person in whose name such vehicle is
registered shall be regarded as the violator 26 was deemed con2 7 Such
stitutional in City of Chicago v. Crane.
holding represents a matter of practical importance to every municipality
of any size because of the increased use of automobiles and
the extreme difficulty of apprehending every violator at the
moment of his offense.
Any intimation which may have been found in recent
cases 28 to the effect that, in order to sustain a complaint of
unlawful search and seizure, the property seized must belong
to the defendant was flatly rejected in People v. Grod.9 It
appeared, in that case, that during defendant's detention at a
police station, a search of defendant's home was made without
warrant and certain stolen property was found therein definitely belonging to the brother of the complaining witness.
Such property, over objection and motion to suppress, was
received in evidence in the trial court. Conviction was reversed
when the upper court held that such action violated the defendant's constitutional rights." It was also indicated that if
defendant was obliged to claim ownership of the property in
order to secure suppression thereof he would be forced to
admit a possession which, unless explained, would itself have
been sufficient to support conviction." The Illinois Supreme
24

As to proof of adultery, see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 38, §47.

25 State v. Thomas, 144 Ala. 77, 40 So. 271 (1906).
26 Municipal Code of Chicago, §27-34.1, as amended Aug. 5, 1942.
27 319 Ill. App. 623, 49 N. E.
(2d) 802 (1943), noted in 22 CHICAGO-KENT
LAW REVIEW 87.
28 People v. Exum, 382 Ill. 204, 47 N. E. (2d)
56 (1943); People v. Marvin,
358 Ill. 426, 193 N. E. 202 (1934); and People v. Patterson, 354 1ll. 313, 188 N. E.
417 (1933).
29 385 Ill.
584, 53 N. E. (2d) 591 (1944).
SOIll. Const. 1870, Art. II, §6 and §10.
31 A distinction was noted as to cases of search of the person or immediate
surroundings of the defendant at time of arrest. See cases noted ante, footnote 28.
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Court, although admittedly in the minority on this point,3 2
still prefers to adhere closely to the views expounded by the
United States Supreme Court.3
The scope of cross-examination, both of the defendant
and witnesses in his behalf, for the purpose of showing a former
conviction of crime to affect their credibility 4 was given exhaustive analysis in the case of People v. Halkens 11 which
makes some important distinctions from principles laid down
long ago in Bartholomew v. People." The court did, however,
reiterate the requirement that proof of conviction of a prior
offense, at least as to the defendant, must be made by a copy
of the record of such conviction. Such prior conviction must
not, according to People v. Henneman,37 be so stale that it bears
only a remotely possible effect on the defendant's credibility
at the time of trial.
A form of instruction not infrequently offered by the prosecution in criminal cases directs the jury that the reasonable
doubt which will authorize acquittal must be on the "whole of
the evidence and not as to any particular fact in the case not
necessary to constitute the crime charged." The vice in such
instruction lies in the fact that it is left to the jury to determine what are the material facts. For that reason, the use of
such instructions has been criticized unless they are accompanied by others which define the material elements of the
offense.2 It became necessary for the court in People v. Berne, 9
When reversing a conviction because that instruction was
utilized, to call attention to the fact that its admonition on
former occasions was being generally overlooked. The court
also declared that the defect will not be remedied by the use
of another instruction which defines the offense as an abstract
proposition of law.
See Wigmore, Evidence, 2d Ed., Vol. IV, §2184.
Agnello v. United States, 269 U. S. 20, 46 S. Ct. 4, 70 L. Ed. 145, 51 A. L. R.
409 (1925); Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 6 S. Ct. 524, 29 L. Ed. 746
(1886).
34111. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 38, §734.
35 386 Ill. 167, 53 N. E. (2d) 923 (1944).
31 104 Ill. 601, 44 Am. Rep. 97 (1882).
37 323 Ill. App. 124, 54 N. E. (2d) 745 (1944).
38 See People v. Wells, 380 Ill. 347, 44 N. E. (2d) 32, 142 A. L. R. 1262 (1942),
and cases there cited.
39 384 Ill. 334, 51 N. E. (2d) 578 (1943), noted in 42 Mich. L. Rev. 943.
32
33
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While the verdict of the jury will be sufficient if it merely
finds the defendant "guilty" 40 or "guilty in manner and form
as charged in the indictment," 41 there is always grave danger,
when the jury fashions its own form of verdict, that the same
may turn out to be insufficient to support a judgment. That
2 where
danger became real, in People v. Manning,"
the verdict
found the defendant guilty of "assault with a deadly weapon
in manner and form as charged" while the indictment merely
charged assault with intent to inflict a bodily injury. As a
consequence, the conviction had to be reversed and a new trial
ordered. Exercise of a little care at the time such verdict was
tendered would have saved both time and expense for, had the
error been noticed prior to the time the verdict was received,
the court could have refused to accept the same and given suitable instruction to the jury on the point.
Theft of a motor vehicle in Illinois may result in prosecution for grand larceny 4 3 or for larceny of a motor vehicle."
As these offenses are treated as distinct crimes, the test as to
which is charged in an indictment has been made to turn on
whether or not there is reference therein to the value of the
automobile for if so the charge is then to be regarded as one
of grand larceny.' It logically follows from such distinction
that only the proper punishment should be imposed for the
offense involved and, as there are different maximum limits
in the two cases,4 6 care must be taken that the wrong punishment is not assessed. It is now declared, in People v. French,".
that the judgment order must not only fix guilt but must also
recite a finding of value in case the charge is for larceny so as
to aid in the preservation of such distinctions. Failure to so
find, together with the fact that although the indictment
charged larceny the sentence imposed was for theft of a motor
vehicle, was there held sufficient to warrant reversal.
,0Eyman v. People, 6 Ill. (1 Gil.) 4 (1844).
41 People v Lee, 237 Ill. 272, 86 N. E. 573 (1908).
42 320 Ill. App. 143, 50 N. E. (2d) 118 (1943).
4.3 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 38, §387.

Ibid., §388a.
People v. Brown, 383 Ill. 287, 48 N. E. (2d) 953 (1943).
46 Punishment for larceny shall not exceed ten years in the penitentiary if the
car is valued in excess of $15.00 under Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 38, §389, whereas
the maximum punishment for larceny of an automobile is twenty years under
45

§388a.
47 387 ll. 16, 55 N. E. (2d)

53 (1944).
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It is fundamental law that the executive head of the state
is not bound to grant a request for extradition, 8 but if he does
do so a question is likely to arise as to whether or not it is
possible for him to attach conditions to the grant whereby the
person sought may be returned to the asylum state at some
future time so as to complete a sentence imposed by it. If the
offender does not demonstrate consent to such transfer, as by
accepting a conditional parole, it now appears, by reason of
the decision in People ex rel. Barrettv. Bartley,"9 that the state
will lose jurisdiction over him when honoring the extradition
request as such transfer will operate as a pardon of the unexpired portion of the offender's sentence.
V. FAMILY LAW
Problems arising from migratory divorce were left far
from settled by the decision of the United States Supreme
Court in Williams v. North CarolinaI despite widespread newspaper accounts declaring that by such decision that court had
made foreign decrees obtained on transient residence binding
upon the sister states under the full faith and credit clause.2
Such newspaper law may have, in part, accounted for the Appellate Court decision in Stephens v. Stephens3 which held
that an Illinois court was not free to inquire into the jurisdictional basis of a foreign decree particularly when such decree
recited a finding of jurisdictional facts. Although that case
was not taken to the Illinois Supreme Court, an appeal from
the decision in Atkins v. Atkins I did reach the higher court
where it was held that the courts of Illinois were not precluded from conducting their own investigation into the
validity of the foreign decree. For that reason a Nevada decree, obtained by a husband who had been a resident of this
state but had migrated to Nevada and there obtained a
divorce after separate maintenance proceedings had been in&8Ex Parte Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U. S. (24 How.) 66, 16 L. Ed. 717 (1861).
49 383 Ill. 437, 50 N. E. (2d) 517 (1943), noted in 22 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REVIEW 226.
1 317 U. S. 287, 63 S. Ct. 207, 87 L. Ed. 279, 143 A. L. R. 1273 (1942).
2 U. S. Const., Art IV, §1.
A3319 Il1. App. 292, 49 N. E. (2d) 560 (1943), noted in 22 CHICAGO-KENT
LAW REVIEW 77 and 32 11. B. J. 275. Dove, J., wrote a dissenting opinion.
4 386 Ill. 345, 54 N. E. (2d) 488 (1944), noted post, p. 90.
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stituted by the wife in Illinois, was held to be no bar to the
latter action particularly since the husband's residence in
Nevada was clearly transitory in nature.
Less satisfactory, however, is the reported decision in
McFarlin v. McFarlin5 which brought up the point of the
constitutionality of the proviso I which was added in 1939 to
Section 5 of the Divorce Act I purporting to fix venue in divorce
actions. An attempt was made, by that proviso, to confer
jurisdiction over divorce cases on the city courts so long as
the plaintiff was a resident of the county in which such city
court was located and the defendant personally submitted to
jurisdiction by filing an appearance. Doubts as to the constitutionality of that provision were engendered by the holding
in Werner v. Illinois Central Railroad Company I which had
narrowed the jurisdiction of the city courts in civil cases to
those matters arising within the city limits. There is enough
language in the McFarlin opinion to cause a belief that divorce
cases should also be so limited, but the action of the trial
court in setting aside a divorce granted by a city court was
reversed when the Illinois Supreme Court failed to find in the
record any evidence that the plaintiff, while resident in the
county, was or was not also a resident of the particular city
concerned. The fundamental problem has, therefore, been left
unsettled for the court was careful to state that the decision
was restricted to the narrow scope allowed by the precise
facts of that case.9
The desire to produce a clear break between persons about
to be divorced has often led to the formulation of agreements
for the payment of lump sums in lieu of alimony or property
rights. If such contracts are performed in full at the time the
marriage is dissolved there is no likelihood of legal difficulty
arising therefrom. If, however, full performance is to take
a period of time, as by the payment of the agreed amount in
instalments, questions may arise as to the enforceability of
the terms of such contracts. When any such agreement be5 384 Ill.
428, 51 N. E. (2d) 520 (1943).

Wilson, J., dissented.
0 Laws 1939, p. 517.
-7 Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 40, §6.
8 379 Ill.559, 42 N. E. (2d) 82 (1942), noted in 21 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REVIEW 116, reversing 309 Ill.App. 292, 33 N. E. (2d) 121 (1941).
9 384 II. 428 at 435, 51 N. E. (2d) 520 at 523.
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comes incorporated in the decree of divorce it apparently loses
its absolute character and becomes subject to suitable modification or destruction, according to Banck v. Bawk,10 even
though it may purport to .be a final settlement of property
rights and also to be binding regardless of a change in the
status of the parties. The remarriage of the recipient of the
benefits of such a contract was there held an excuse from the
obligation to make further payment of the deferred instalments. 11 Drangle v. Lindauer,12 on the other hand, seems to
point a way to the avoidance of the consequences of such a
rule. No such settlement is possible though, where the relief
sought is not divorce but merely separate maintenance for
the policy of the law forbids any compromise of the husband's
duty to support his wife. 3 For that reason, a claim by a wife
against the estate of a deceased husband, based on the provisions of a separate maintenance decree which had approved
a lump sum settlement in full of all claims for support, was
rejected in In re Young's Estate.14 Argument directed to the
point that to deny the claim meant permitting collateral attack
on the separate maintenance decree was answered by the statement that the trial court was without jurisdiction to enter
an order approving such a settlement.
In much the same way, a clear distinction should be observed between the power of a court when hearing a divorce
case to settle the property rights of the spouses 5 in contrast
to the absence of power to so decree when the action is one
for separate maintenance. A separate maintenance decree
which made a division of real estate between the parties in
Petta v. Petta 16 was, therefore, properly reversed particularly
since there was no prayer for such relief. It would seem,
though, under the liberal provisions of the Civil Practice Act,"'
1o 322 Il. App. 369, 54 N. E. (2d) 577 (1944), noted in 22 CHICAGO-KENT
LAW REVIEW 276. Dady, P. J., wrote a dissenting opinion. Leave to appeal has
been denied.
11 See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 40, §19.
12323 Ill. App. 23, 54 N. E. (2d) 751 (1944), noted in 22 CHICAGO-KENT
LAW REVIEW 276, particularly p. 280.
A Vock v. Vock, 365 fI1. 432, 6 N. E. (2d) 843, 109 A. L. R. 1170 (1937).
14 319 l1. App. 513, 49 N. E. (2d) 742 (1943).
15 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 40, §18.
16 321 IMI. App. 512, 53 N. E. (2d) 324 (1944), noted in 22 CHICAGO-KENT
LAW REVIEW 281.
17 nl. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 110, §168(1).
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that property claims could well be litigated in the same proceeding with the question of separate maintenance provided
the property claims were presented as independent causes of
action.
Analogous to the problem of the amount of recognition to
be given to foreign divorce decrees was the issue in Brown v.
Hall 1 dealing with the question of the validity of a decree of
adoption granted by the court of a sister state. When it appeared therein that the adopting parent had deliberately
chosen such sister state in order to accomplish what could
not be done in Illinois, i. e. adopt an adult person, 9 and had
also failed to become a bona fide resident thereof, the court
denied recognition to the foreign decree. In somewhat the
same fashion, the court in Fuhrhop v. Austin 1o refused to
apply the law of the place of birth of a child in order to determine legitimacy when it appeared that such law was contrary to the public policy of this state and that title to Illinois
land was involved.21
The settlement of custodial rights over the offspring of
marriages terminated by divorce undoubtedly produces the
most difficult problem of human relations that a chancellor
could be called upon to decide. He has been assisted somewhat
by the doctrine that, as between the actual parent on the one
hand and the grandparent of the infant on the other, exclusive custody belongs to the parent if he or she is otherwise
a fit and proper person to rear a growing child.2 2 A close adherence to that rule should have led to the denial of the petition in Solomon v. Solomon - by which a limited right of custody and visitation over the infant was sought on behalf of
the paternal grandparents. The court seemed to feel, however,
seeing that the request was made by the child's father who
385 Ill.260, 52 N. E. (2d) 781 (1944).
19 Only minors may be adopted here by reason of Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 4,
§1, and Bartholow v. Davies, 276 Ill. 505, 114 N. E. 1017 (1917).
- 385 Ill. 149, 52 N. E. (2d) 267 (1944).
21 The court distinguished the situation from that found in Peirce v. Peirce,
379 hi. 185, 39 N. E., (2d) 990 (1942).
v. Sheehan, 373 Ill. 79, 25 N. E. (2d) 502 (1940), reversing 300 Ill.
2People
App. 228, 20 N. E. (2d) 809 (1939). See also Kulan v. Anderson, 300 Ill. App.
267, 20 N. E. (2d) 987 (1939).
2

319 Ill. App. 618, 49 N. E. (2d) 807 (1943).
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had been granted such a privilege but was unable to exercise
the same because of service in the armed forces, that it would
be proper to permit the request as a means of preserving contact between the divorced parent and his son. The underlying
policy of the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act of 1940, as
amended,2 was said to warrant this minor infraction of the
former doctrine.
VI. PROPERTY
REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY
Ordinarily when one desires to check the title to a particular parcel of land he considers that he has properly safeguarded himself by viewing the premises to ascertain the
rights of those in possession and by checking all pertinent
information contained in the public records. Through its decision in the case of Chicago Title and Trust Company v.
Wabash-Randolph Corporation,' however, the Illinois Supreme
Court has apparently increased the burden of the title searcher.
In that case one Walker agreed to sell a parcel of land to
one McKey, the contract stipulating that a way of ingress and
egress be left open to conform to a similar way left open on
the adjoining property. While the final deed which consummated the transaction failed to include this provision, the way
was nevertheless left open. Some time later a subsequent purchaser of part of the McKey property enclosed the passageway by constructing a store thereon. In an action brought to
compel such purchaser to remove the obstruction, the court
held that since the agreement by McKey to create the easement could not have been fulfilled by the mere delivery of the
deed there had been no merger. The obvious result of such a
decision would seem to be that (1) an easement can be created
by a mere contract, and (2) no one can. any longer rely upon
a recorded deed of conveyance to determine whether or not
an easement was created or reserved, but must also examine
the contract which led up to such deed to verify that no unperformed provisions thereof remain to cloud the title.
In the case of Mitchell v. Illinois Central Railroad Com24 50 U.
1384 11.

S. C. A., §501 et seq.
78, 51 N. E. (2d) 132 (1943), noted in 22 CHICAGO-KENT LAW

REVIEW 223.
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pany 2 the rights of the grantee of an easement were expanded
to an unprecedented degree. The predecessor in interest to
the plaintiff therein conveyed to the predecessor in interest
of the defendant railroad a strip of land "for the purpose of
constructing, maintaining and operating thereon a single or
double track railway, with all the necessary appurtenances."
Defendant leased a portion of such strip for use as a "combination bulk oil and filling station," which lease was subsequently approved by the Illinois Commerce Commission. The
owner of the underlying fee brought action to enjoin the use
of such portion of the railroad right of way as a retail drive-in
gasoline station. The Appellate Court had held for plaintiff
on the ground that the lease was an improper use of the easement, but this decision was reversed by the Illinois Supreme
Court apparently for the reason that it seemed to be the
practice of the Illinois Commerce Commission to encourage
railroads to lease portions of their rights of way in order to
increase revenues. At the same time, the court seems to have
completely ignored factors which should have been considered,
such as the terminology of the grant of easement with its
restriction of use to railway purposes or the necessary appurtenances thereof and the fact that the oil station could have
carried on its business completely independently of the railroad as the lease thereof did not require the lessee to use the
railroad for the transportation of gasoline to its station.
The fact that land is subject to an easement of right of
way for highway purposes does not destroy the right of the
owner of the servient estate to the minerals located therein.
He may, however, have to overcome practical difficulties in
order to remove the same so as not to disturb the right of the
public to use the highway laid out under such an easement.
Such an owner, in Simpson v. Adkins3 thought he had accomplished that objective when he obtained the consent of the
local highway commissioner to the erection and maintenance
of oil-drilling equipment on the surface within the area covered
by the easement but placed so as not to obstruct the traveled
238411. 258, 51 N. E. (2d) 271 (1943), noted in 22 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REVIEW 290, reversing 317 11. App. 501, 47 N. E. (2d) 115 (1943). Murphy, J.,
dissented.
3 389 1l. 64, 53 N. E. (2d) 979 (1944), noted in 22 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REVIEW 293.
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portion of the public way. He was, however, commanded to
remove such equipment when the court declared that his acts
amounted to a violation of the criminal law. 4 Not being the
owner of adjacent property, he was, therefore, left owning
the minerals in place but without means to enjoy the fruits of
his ownership.
Some cases dealing with the relationship of landlord and
tenant are also worthy of comment. Restrictive covenants
in leases limiting the tenant's use of the demised premises
are not at all rare. More unusual, however, are restrictions
in favor of the tenant limiting the lessor's use of other property owned by him and not included in the demised area.
Such restrictions, if otherwise legal, are undoubtedly binding on the person making the covenant' but whether they
will bind the lessee of such other property is a matter of some
doubt." It has now been decided, in Farm Food Stores, Inc. v.
7 that even the latter Will be bound thereby if he
Gianeschi,
has knowledge thereof prior to taking possession so that injunction may be obtained to prevent a violation- of the restrictive covenant.
It has long been declared that a lease must have a certain beginning and a certain ending in order to possess
validity.8 If the term is uncertain, the arrangement will constitute but an estate at will terminable by either party. But
a lease will be deemed sufficiently certain to serve as an estate
for years if, by reference to a certainty, the period of its
duration can be made certain.9 Suit for possession was contested, therefore, in Stanmeyer v. Davis,'* on the ground that
a lease to run "for the duration of the war" was for a fixed
and definite period because based on an event that was reasonIll. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 38, §§ 466-7, and Ch. 121, §167.
University Club v. Deakin, 265 Ill. 257, 106 N. E. 790, L. R. A. 1915C 854
(1914).
6 A covenant restricting lessor's use of other property was held not to prevent a similar use thereof by another in Postal Tel. Co. v.. W. U. Tel. Co., 155
1l. 335, 40 N. E. 587 (1895), as such restriction was there strictly construed.
7 320 Ill. App. 582, 51 N. E. (2d) 792 (1943).
8 Say v. Smith, 1 Plowden 269, 75 Eng. Rep. 410 (1561).
a DePauw University v. United Elec. Coal Cos., 299 1l. App. 339, 20 N. E.
(2d) 146 (1939); Easton v. Mitchell, 21 Ill. App. 189 (1886).
1D 321 Ill. App. 227, 53 N. E. (2d) 22 (1944), noted in 39 Ill. L. Rev. 85. Leave
to appeal has been denied.
4
5
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ably sure to happen, hence was not a leasing terminable at
will. 1 While the court inclined to that view, it nevertheless
granted possession to the lessor when it appeared that further
uncertainty was produced as to the duration of the term by
additional language to the effect that the lease was to continue until "automobiles are again produced" and until "defendant [lessee] receives twenty-five automobiles in any one
month." 12 There being nothing to show that the lessee was
obliged to receive that many automobiles a month, it could
not be said that the lessor would ever be in a position to know
when the lease came to an end.
The practice of taking deposits to secure the faithful performance of the lessee's obligations under a written lease is
well known. Clauses covering such deposits, while providing
for the forfeiture thereof, usually reserve to the lessor all
other rights of action as for non-payment of rent, etc., and it
would ordinarily be no defense to a suit for such rent that
the landlord is possessed of a security deposit. There would
seem to be no legal reason, however, which would prevent the
parties from stipulating that, in case of default by the lessee,
the lease shall terminate and the lessor be restricted to a
forfeiture of the deposit. That effect was given to an ambiguous provision in a lease involved in Weill v. Centralia
Service & Oil Company 1 even though the lessor claimed that
to permit such construction would mean that the lessee would
be allowed to take advantage of his own default. Of similar
interest on the question of termination is the case of Deibler
v. BernardBrothers, Incorporated," which deals with the problem of the tenant's right to claim that his lease and the obligations thereunder were cancelled by operation of law inasmuch as federal regulations prevented him from using the
demised premises for the purpose for which he had rented
the same. No relief was granted when it appeared that the
tenant was entitled to make any other lawful use of the
premises.
11 Swift v. Macbean, [1942] 1 K. B. 375, indicates that such period is sufficiently definite.
12321 Ill. App. 227 at 229, 53 N. E. (2d) 22 at 23.
22320 Ill. App. 397, 51 N. E. (2d) 345 (1943).
14385 Ill. 610, 53 N. E. (2d) 450 (1944), affirming 319 Ill. App. 504, 48 N. E.
(2d) 422 (1943). The case is discussed in more detail ante, p. 11.
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A failure on the part of a lessor to pay the general taxes
assessed against the demised premises, so that the same became sold for non-payment of taxes, was utilized by the
tenant in Beach v. Boettcher " to defeat the lessor's action for
possession. The claim that the lessee was estopped from questioning the lessor's title was answered by the statement, new
in Illinois, that a subsequent destruction thereof by tax deed
was not within the limits of such estoppel. There is some
reason to doubt, however, that a tax deed has such effect in
this state" so that, had the tenant been forced to prove a
valid destruction of the lessor's title, the outcome of the case
might have been different. In the interest of eventual justice,
the lessee was permitted to remain in possession so long as
he deposited accrued rentals in the registry of the court.
While the general doctrines of law relating to personal
property remain unchanged, two unusual questions concerning the transferability thereof came before the courts. Although personal property capable of delivery, actually or constructively, may generally be the subject of a gift, some doubt
may arise over the validity of a gift thereof if such property is declared to be non-negotiable and non-transferable.
Such, at least, was the question in Blair v. Kirchneris where
the donor under a gift caua mortk manually delivered certain
United States Postal Savings Certificates to a donee without
endorsement but with intent to make the donee owner thereof.
It was held that the provision forbidding negotiation did not
prevent a transfer by assignment, subject to any equities between the maker and the payee," while the limitation on
transferability could only operate as between the maker and
the donee, so that, as against the estate of the donor, the
donee was entitled to whatever value such certificates might
possess in the hands of the latter even though they might
not be enforcible against the maker by reason of such limita15 323 Ill. App. 79, 55 N. E. (2d) 104 (1944), noted post, p. 96. Leave to
appeal has been denied.
16 See Hacklander, Validity of Tax Titles in Illinois, 17 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REVIEW 119 (1939).
17 The case turned on admitted pleadings: 323 IMI. App. 79 at 88, 55 N. E. (2d)
104 at 108.
i8 319 Ill. App. 348, 49 N. E. (2d) 292 (1943), noted in 42 Mich. L. Rev. 531.
i oPrins v. South Branch Lumber Co., 20 Ill. App. 236 (1886).
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tion. 2 0 The earlier holding in In re Estate of Wallace 21 was
distinguished, both on the law and the facts, as the certificates
there concerned were United States Treasury Certificates and
payment was subject to regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury.
The negotiation or hypothecation of notes taken for loans
of money made under the Small Loans Act, 22 however, is re-

stricted by a requirement contained in Section 12 thereof 22
which purports to limit the right to the extent that such
pledge can be made only with a bank authorized to do business in Illinois and then only under an agreement permitting
the Director of Insurance to examine the papers so hypothecated.2 4 Attack upon the constitutionality of such restriction
only 12 was successfully made in Metropolitan Trust Company
V. Jones 26 on the ground that it denied a trust company, organ-

ized in Illinois, the right to exercise its powers and property
without due process of law

27

by preventing it from acting as

trustee under contract with lenders, other than banks, who
wished to loan money on the pledge of such small-loan paper.
Although the court recognized that it was in the power of
the legislature to forbid any hypothecation of such notes, it
found that it was not intended that the licensee under the
Small Loans Act should be limited to loaning his own capital
hence he should be entitled to obtain credit, if necessary, by
hypothecation. If regulation of that practice was desirable,
20 Inquiry by the court, pursuant to stipulation, elicited the response of the
Postmaster General that, despite the language against transferability, he would
recognize the rights of the donee to the money represented by the certificates
provided a valid decree established the donee's interest by reason of a perfected gift causa mortis: 319 Ill. App. 348 at 353, 49 N. E. (2d) 292 at 295.
21266 hi1. App. 500 (1932).
22 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 74, §19 et seq.
23

Ibid., §30.

The Director also appears to have subjected the practice, by regulation, to
the requirement that the pledgor is to be regarded as agent for the pledgee for
the purpose of accepting payments on such notes: Metropolitan Trust Co. v.
Jones, 384 Ill. 248 at 250, 51 N. E. (2d) 256 at 258 (1943).
25 The balance of Section 12, and the rest of the act, was upheld on the theory
that the invalid part could be separated without destroying the rest of the
fabric: 384 Ill. 248 at 258, 51 N. E. (2d) 256 at 261.
26 384 Ill.248, 51 N. E. (2d) 256 (1943).
§2, but also on
27 The argument rested not only on Ill. Const. 1870, Art. Il,
Art. IV, §22, which forbids the passage of special laws granting to any corporation special or exclusive privileges, immunities or franchises.
24

SURVEY OF ILLINOIS LAW-1948-1944

the court indicated that, as both banks and trust companies
were open to state inspection, 8 there was no basis for any discrimination between them.
SECURITY

TRANSACTIONS

Fundamental principles regarding the creation of security
for money loaned or credit advanced have gone undisturbed 2
but the enforcement of rights thereby obtained have received
some additional attention. For example, a pledge of the rents,
issues and profits of the mortgaged premises, such as is usually found in the average mortgage or trust deed, does not
automatically give the mortgagee a right thereto, hence another creditor may, by appropriate action, gain a better lien
thereon.30 That pledge may be made enforcible, however, at
time of foreclosure by seeking equitable assistance as through
the appointment of a receiver or by taking actual possession
of the mortgaged premises.3 1 If a receiver has already been
appointed at the request of another creditor, since two distinct receivers cannot control the same property, the mortgagee is then, necessarily, confined to seeking an extension
of the original receivership for his benefit also2 2 When he
does so, according to Stevens v. Blue.,3 he should be sure that
the extension actually covers the rents, for the pledge in
favor of the mortgagee will not be made effective if the order
appointing the receiver is amended simply to extend the same
to protect the corpus of the mortgaged premises for his
benefit.
An interesting application of the statute permitting
partial redemptions from sales under foreclosure decrees" '
-8 Compare Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 16/2, §8, with Ibid., Ch. 32, §298.
29 Attention is directed to the decision in Donn v. Auto Dealers Investment
Co., 385 Ill. 211, 52 N. E. (2d) 695 (1944), noted ante, p. 14, dealing with priority between successive trust receipts.
80 Fidelity Trust & Say. Bank v. Ahlgrim, 278 Ill. App. 147 (1934).
s, West Side Tr. and Sav. Bank v. Lopoten, 358 Ill. 631, 193 N. E. 462 (1934),
reversing 273 Ill. App. 629 (1934).
32 Seegren v Decker, 263 Ill. App. 373 (1931).
88320 Ill. App. 375, 51 N. E. (2d) 603 (1943). Leave to appeal was granted
and it would seem that the decision of the Appellate Court has been reversed.
See 33 Ill. B. J. 50 which gives a synopsis of the decision in Stalzer v. Stevens,
Case No. 27891, which is apparently the same case. The opinion has not yet
appeared in the official reports.
"Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 77, §26.
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was involved in Muir v. Mierwin 1 where the owner had conveyed premises encumbered by a mortgage to her children as
tenants in common but had expressly provided in the deed
that the mortgage should be chargeable against the interests
of only certain of the grantees and then only in a stated
order of liability. Upon sale of the entire premises en masse
for non-payment of the mortgage at maturity, certain of the
grantees for whose benefit the grantor had established the
order of liability sought to redeem their respective interests
by tendering their portion of the debt due. The purchaser
at the sale contended that, since the premises had been sold
en masse, the redemption should be made in the same way.
Such claim was rejected and partial redemption granted by
the Appellate Court by reason of the language of the statute
aforementioned. The Supreme Court, on granting leave to
appeal, agreed that the grantees might legally have made a
partial redemption but found that the amount tendered was
insufficient because (1) interest had. been calculated at the
rate of five per cent. instead of the six per cent. rate called
for by statute," and (2) because the redemptioners were not
entitled to credit on the redemption price of moneys in the
hands of the court as the ownership thereof was still in dispute. For these reasons the decision of the Appellate Court
was reversed."
The respective rights of mortgagor and mortgagee to a
fund of money deposited in satisfaction of a condemnation
award for the taking of a portion of the mortgaged premises
were under consideration in City of Chioago v. Salinger38
It was contended by the mortgagee that, inasmuch as he had
acquired title to the balance of the premises through foreclosure sale, he was entitled to the whole of the award even
though the same became payable prior to his acquisition of
the mortgagor's title. He was restricted, however, to the satisfaction of his deficiency judgment only.
Although many similarities exist between a conditional
35319 Il. App. 286, 49 N. E. (2d) 265 (1943).
86 Il. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 77, §18.

37 385 Ill. 273, 52 N. E. (2d) 801 (1944), reversing 319 Il. App. 286, 49 N. E.
(2d) 265 (1943).
38 384 fl1. 515, 52 N. E. (2d) 184 (1944), affirming 317 ill. App. 542, 47 N. E.
(2d) 725 (1943), which had been noted in 22 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 94.
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sales agreement and a chattel mortgage, each has a distinct
function to perform and the two may not be interchanged indiscriminately. The former is appropriately confined for use
between a vendor and a vendee while the latter is designed
to produce security in cases of loan of money upon chattels.
A misuse of these concepts led to grief, in Raymond v. Horan,
0 where a financier took a condiBailiff of Municipal Court,"
tional sales contract as security for an-advance made to a
person contemplating the purchase of certain chattels rather
than a chattel mortgage thereon and was subordinated to the
rights of an intervening execution creditor. The court deemed
it insufficient to change its view that, prior to execution of
the conditional sales contract, the borrower had made a bill of
sale of the goods to the lender and had simultaneously received
one back."0 Reality, rather than form, was regarded as essential.
In order to secure an enforcible attorney's lien notice must
be given to the person against whom such lien is claimed either
by delivering the same to the individual personally"' or else
by sending such notice by registered mail.2 Attempts to gain
service in any other fashion as, for example, by the use of
ordinary mail, will be ineffective according to the holding in
Cazalet v. Cazalet4 which case also indicates that the notice
should affirmatively assert a right to a lien and the amount
thereof and not let those facts rest on inferences to be drawn
from a recital of the terms of the retainer contract between
the attorney claiming the lien and his client.
Action by a subcontractor to enforce a mechanics' lien
heretofore had to be instituted within four months after the
time when final payment became due." When the legislature
repealed that requirement " it also amended other sections of
' s323 Ill. App. 120, 55 N. E. (2d) 99 (1944).
46 Absence of title in the supposed vendor was declared to make the purported
conditional sales contract invalid as against other creditors in First State Bank
v. Harter, 301 Ill. App. 234, 22 N. E. (2d) 393 (1939).
' Notice to his attorney is insufficient according to Molthrop v. New York,
C. & St. L. R. Co., 245 ll. App. 8 (1927); Reynolds v. Alton, G. & St. L.
T. Co., 211 fli. App. 158 (1918). See also Haj v. American Bottle Co., 261 Ill.
362, 103 N. E. 1000, Ann. Cas. 1915A 220 (1914).
42 Ill.Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 13, §14.
4s 322 Ill.
App. 105, 54 N. E. (2d) 61 (1944). Leave to appeal has been denied.
Ill.Laws 1941, Vol. 1, p. 850.
i
-Ill.Rev. Stat. 1939, Ch. 82, §33.
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the Mechanics' Lien Law so as to give the subcontractor substantially the same rights as a general contractor,"6 including
the same period of limitation in which to file a lien claim " or
bring suit to enforce the lien."3 It has now been held, in
Builders Supply & Lumber Company v. Calto,9 that such revision is to be accorded retroactive effect at least insofar as the
owner of the premises is concerned.
WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION

The device of drafting a will passing title to property to
trustees for transfer to the spouse if such spouse is living ten
days after the death of the testator or testatrix, otherwise to
the children or other beneficiaries named in other provisions
of the will, was approved in Ickes v. Ickes,"° as a proper method
of avoiding, in the case of semi-simultaneous death in the same
accident, the effect of vesting property in a spouse who might
die shortly after the testator's death.
Probate of a foreign will is expressly sanctioned by Section 85 of the Probate Act,6' whether the same has or has not
already been admitted to probate in the state of the testator's
domicile, which section reiterates doctrines recognized in this
state in former times.2 For that reason the decision in In re
Nielsen's Estate13 does not represent any new law, but it does
disclose that no change has occurred by reason of the adoption
of the new Probate Act for a will executed in Illinois in conformity with the laws of this state disposing of land located
here. was granted original probate regardless of the fact that
the testator was not domiciled in Illinois at the time of his
death.
Attention was directed last year to the holding in Lewis
v. Hill 4 which declared that a sale of real estate by a con46 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 82, §28.
'7 Ibid., §7.
48 Ibid., §9.
49320 Ill. App. 1, 49 N. E. (2d) 876 (1943).
50 386 Ill. 19, 53 N. E. (2d) 585 (1944).
.51 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 3, §237.
52 See Chicago Terminal R. Co. v. Winslow, 216 Ill. 166, 74 N. E. 815 (1905).
53 320 Ill. App. 655, 52 N. E. (2d) 44 (1943), cause transferred 382 Ill. 422, 47
N. E. (2d) 697 (1943).
5317 Ill. App. 531, 47 N. E. (2d) 127 (1943), noted in 22 CHICAGO-KENT
LAW REVIEW 56.
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servator of an incompetent person would not operate to adeem
a specific devise made thereof through the will of the ward
executed prior to the time such person became incompetent.
A decree which had dismissed a petition by the devisee to reach
the fund so realized was there reversed and the cause remanded. The same case reached the reviewing courts again
this year when a decree rendered pursuant to such mandate
was affirmed, 5 thereby giving full recognition to the doctrine
of equitable conversion.
The Illinois Supreme Court had occasion, in McQueen v.
O'Connor, to consider the effect of that part of Section 90 of
the Probate Act " which reduced the time for filing a complaint to contest a will. As could be expected after the decision rendered last year in Masin v. Bassford5 8 the court held
that the right to contest a will was not a vested right, might
be abrogated or limited by legislative action at any time even
after the period had already begun to run, and that the law
in effect when the will contest suit was filed governed the time
for filing the suit. In the case of filing claims, however, the
saving clause of the Probate Act " was held applicable, according to Paschall v. Reed, 0 so that the longer period granted
under an earlier law was held controlling once it had started
to operate in favor of the creditor.
Procedural matters growing out of the administration of
estates have also received judicial consideration. Thus a con'
flict of claims such as might arise between a judgment creditor
and the executor under a will, when the judgment debtor is both
a devisee and a debtor of the estate, was resolved in favor of
the executor in Meppen V. Meppen 81 without regard to the date
r- Lewis v. Hill, 322 Ill. App. 68, 53 N. E.
(2d) 736 (1944). A certificate of
importance was issued and the cause was taken by the Illinois Supreme Court
which also affirmed in 387 Ill. 542, 56 N. E. (2d) 619 (1944), not in the period
of this survey.
56 385 Ill. 455, 53 N. E. (2d) 435 (1944), noted in 22 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REVIEW 302.
57 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 3, §242.
- 381 Ill. 569, 46 N. E. (2d) 366 (1943), noted in 22 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REVIEW 55.
59 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 3, §501.
s0 320 Ill. App. 390, 51 N. E. (2d) 342 (1943).
61321 Ill. App. 566, 53 N. E. (2d) 462 (1944).
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of the judgment. Action by an executor who had filed citation
proceedings to discover knowledge and information only with
respect to alleged assets of decedent's estate was held, in
Bchwaan V. Schwaan,'2 to constitute no bar to a second petition directed against the same respondent to recover property,
where the order dismissing the first petition did not show that
any matter had been determined on the merits. An heir at
law was held to be an aggrieved person, in In re Everly's Estate,3 for the purpose of permitting an appeal from the allowance of a claim even though decedent died testate and the assets of the estate were more than sufficient to pay all claims
as well as the legacy given to the heir. When so holding, the
court pointed out that, as the time allowed to the heir in which
to contest the will had not expired when the appeal was perfected and it did not appear that the heir had elected not to
file such a contest, his right to complain could not be disregarded.
It is usually essential, in the conduct of proceedings to
sell real estate to pay debts, that all necessary parties be
named therein, but, according to the holding in Baker v.
Devlin," the mere fact that the property is alleged to be encumbered by unpaid taxes does not make it necessary that
the municipalities possessing such tax liens be made parties
if no relief is sought against them. For that matter, according
to the same case, it is not necessary that the decree of sale in
such a proceeding contain a conditional direction of sale giving
the heirs an opportunity to pay an amount sufficient to cover
the claims and costs of administration within a time fixed as
would be the case, for example, in mortgage foreclosures.
While an administrator may, in such a proceeding, seek to
remove a cloud upon decedent's title, 65 Roff man v. Roffman
decides that he may not attack his decedent's title to the realty.
In Griefin v. Garin," the Illinois Supreme Court held that
-2320 1i. App. 287, 50 N. E. (2d) 861 (1943).
- Sub nom. Zimmerman v. Gumbart, Grigsby & Gumbart, 322 I1. App. 363,
54 N. E. (2d) 627 (1944), noted post, p. 94.
6386
I1. 441, 54 N. E. (2d) 449 (1944).
65 Il1. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 3, §388.
66 384 l. 315, 51 N. E. (2d) 560 (1943).
eT 385 Ill. 471, 53 N. E. (2d) 410 (1944), reversing 318 11. App. 151, 47 N. E.
(2d) 356 (1943).
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recovery could be had on a refunding bond which had been
given by a distributee to, obtain a partial distribution of a
decedent's estate prior to the expiration of the period of probate, despite the objection that the condition of the bond had
not been broken because no additional claims had been presented, when it appeared that a subsequently discovered will
was admitted to probate under the terms of which such distributee was not entitled to any'portion of the estatees It also
held that Rule 17 of the Probate Court of Cook County, 9 relating to such bonds, was valid and applicable even though it
contained more stringent requirements than are found in the
statute.
Section 11& of the Probate Act" provides that in a proceeding for the appointment of a conservator the court may
appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the alleged incompetent. The word "may" found therein was held, in Rankin v.
Rankin," to be of a permissive nature and not mandatory so
that, if it appears that the trial court has not abused its discretion in failing to appoint a guardian ad litem, the reviewing
court will not disturb the action of the court on such a petition. Upon appointment of a conservator, no action may be
brought or appeal prosecuted by any other person purporting
to act on behalf of the ward as next friend, without appointment and authority from the court, according to the decision
73
in In re Rankin's Estate.
TRUSTS

There is some slight indication that the traditional immunity of trust beneficiaries from liability on account of obligations incurred by trustees may be "presently marked for
iss See the companion case of In re Estate of Mitchell, 305 Ill. App. 289, 27
N. E. (2d) 606 (1940).
69Rules of Practice, Probate Court of Cook County, effective prior to Jan. 1,
1940. Such rule provided, in part, that "a refunding bond shall be required .
to indemnify the estate against loss by reason of such distribution, unless for
good cause shown the Court shall otherwise order." Ru , 30, revised as of May
1, 1944, now directs that the "refunding bond shall be in the form prescribed by
the Court and furnished by the Clerk."
70 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 3, §446.
71

Ibid., §270.

72

322 Ill. App. 90, 54 X. E. (2d) 58 (1944). Leave to appeal has been denied.

- 322 Ill. App. 64, 53 N. E. (2d) 747 (1944).
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destruction," or at least important limitation. The problem
was presented through the specialized form of the business
trust in two recent cases arising in Illinois. In the first of these
cases, that of Commercial Casualty Insurance Company v.
North,7' a father and son, engaging in the contracting business
as partners, conveyed the assets of the business to themselves
and another as trustees and retained the entire beneficial interest divided between them. The trustees undertook the installation of a high-pressure steam line for certain public agencies
in Nebraska. The son, as trustee, applied in the name of the
trust for a performance bond which was duly issued. The
bonding company successfully defended a suit brought by the
State of Nebraska and sought to recover its expenses from
the father and son under the terms of an indemnity clause in
the bond. The suit was brought on the theory that, since the
defendants retained the beneficial interest and were also trustees, no trust was created and the defendants remained liable
as partners. A judgment for defendants was rendered in the
trial court. The Appellate Court decided that a valid trust
could be created even though two of the trustees were also the
sole beneficiaries. On this point the court relied upon the Restatement of Trusts. 75 Applying the test laid down in Schumann-Heink v. Folsom,7 6 the court further decided that a valid
trust had been created by the acts of the partners. From that
point, the court seemed to think the conclusion irresistible that
the defendants, as beneficiaries, were not liable either individually or as partners. The question of the son's possible liability as trustee was not discussed.
A somewhat similar case came before the Circuit Couft
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. In Reconstruction Finance
Corporationv. Goldberg,7T bank stock was held in the name of
a nominee for three trustees constituting the managing committee of a syndicate which took the legal form of a business
trust. One of the trustees was also the holder of a large beneficial interest in the trust. It was decided that the beneficiaries
or shareholders, including this trustee, were liable to creditors
74 320 Ill.App. 221, 50 N. E. (2d) 434 (1943).
75 Restatement, Trusts, Vol. 1, §99.
76 328 I1.321, 159 N. E. 250 (1927).
77 143 F. (2d) 752 (1944).
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of the bank as beneficial owners of the bank stdck. The opinion
found the syndicate to be a valid business trust under the
Schumann-Heink case but imposed liability as a consequence
of equitable ownership in view of the provisions of the Illinois
Constitution. 8 The exact point has never before been expressly
decided in Illinois.
Dissatisfaction has occasionally been expressed with the
insulation afforded by the trust device to certain classes of
beneficiaries. In the North case, the court apparently assumed
the non-liability of the beneficiaries and thought discussion unnecessary. The Goldberg case, on the other hand, indicates
that the brief for the immunity of beneficiaries is less strong
when the trust is utilized as a form of business organization.
The opinion in the latter case did not indicate the court's views
of the position of the beneficiaries with respect to liabilities
arising out of contracts made by the trustees. The two cases
are, of course, distinguishable with respect to the kind of liability involved.
Two other cases may be briefly mentioned. In Cowdery v.
Northern Trust Company 11 the Appellate Court ruled that undistributed income in the hands of the trustee at the death
of the beneficiary of a spendthrift trust belonged to the trust
and not to the estate of the beneficiary. The spendthrift provisions were relied upon as establishing the intent of the settlor.
In Bundy v. Solon,80 the Supreme Court decided that a direction in a trust instrument to trustees to convey property to
the "heirs-at-law" of a beneficiary required a conveyance of a
share to the wife of the beneficiary. In concluding that the
wife Was within the term "heirs-at-law," the court relied upon
the provisions of the Probate Act "' which allow the wife a
share of her husband's property upon waiver of dower.
VII. TORTS
As usual, the large volume of torts litigation for the past
year contains little that is novel. The decisions are, rather,
IIl. Const. 1870, Art. XI, §6.
App. 243, 53 N. E. (2d) 43 (1944). Leave to appeal has been denied.
8o384 hi. 137, 51 N. E. (2d) 183 (1943), noted in 22 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REVIEW 229.
81 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 3, §162.
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characterized by adherence to fixed principles, although some
of them are interesting by reason of the unusual factual situations involved.
Two such situations are presented in cases involving the
distinction between cause and condition. In Baker V. Cities
Service Oil Company,' for example, a tank truck belonging to
the defendant was parked at the curb while delivering gasoline to a filling station. The deceased, a five-year old boy in
the company of another small child, attempted to cross the
street but was struck and killed by a passing automobile as
he stepped from behind the parked truck. Recovery for the
wrongful death was denied when the court quoted and adopted
the definition laid down in Briske v. Village of Burnham2 to
the effect that if a negligent act or omission does nothing more
than furnish a condition making an injury possible, and such
condition, by the subsequent independent act of a third person, causes an injury, the two acts are not concurrent and the
existence of the condition is not the proximate cause of the
injury.' The court further commented that since the truck was
not in motion but was parked, its position on the street was
obvious to all persons and was a condition necessary to be
reckoned with by the traveling public.
The other case, that of Carr v. Lee J. Behl Hotel Corporation,; presented an entirely different situation in that the condition which was alleged to have been a concurrent and therefore a proximate cause was not obvious and a condition necessary to be reckoned with by the travelling public but was, in
fact, a concealed hazard. The plaintiff there, while walking
along a public alley in the rear of defendant's hotel, slipped
on the alley pavement which was icy and covered with a light
snow. In an effort to regain his balance, he raised his arm and
came in contact with a rear door of the hotel building. The
door opened under the pressure and plaintiff was precipitated
down a flight of concrete steps thereby sustaining injuries. It
was proved that the lock of the door was defective and would
not operate to keep the door securely fastened. The court,
1321 Il. App. 142, 52 N. E. (2d) 284 (1943).
2 379 Ill. 193, 39 N. E. (2d) 976 (1942).
3379 Il. 193 at 199, 39 N. E. (2d) 976 at 979.
4 321 l. App. 432,53 N. E. (2d) 295 (1944).
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denying recovery against the building owner, relied on the
same general principle and concluded that the act of slipping
on the ice was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries, while
the alleged negligent act of keeping the door unlocked or
equipped with a defective lock was nothing more than a condition. The element of "foreseeability" also appears to have
been considered by the court in determining the question for
it declared that the injury "must be the natural and probable
result of the negligent act or omission and be of such a character as an ordinarily prudent person ought to have foreseen as
likely'to occur as a result of the negligence, although it is not
essential that the person charged with negligence should have
foreseen the precise injury which resulted from his act."'
Elements of probability and foreseeability were found insufficient, however, in Neering v. Illinois Central RailroadCompany,' to break the causal chain so that a condition created
by the railroad company in permitting vagrants to congregate
around its unattended passenger stations and waiting rooms
was held to be the proximate cause of injuries to a woman
passenger who was assaulted and raped at the station by a
vagrant. The court expressly recognized that the rule requiring the highest degree of care on the part of carriers for the
protection of passengers applies only to the operation of trains
and the immediate incidents of transportation and that, as to
station buildings and other appurtenances, such carrier is required to exercise only ordinary care to keep them in a reasonably safe condition! Nevertheless, the court indicated that
knowledge of conditions which are likely to result in an assault
upon a passenger, or which constitute a source of potential
danger, imposes the duty of active vigilance on the part of
the carrier's agents and the adoption of such steps as are warranted in the light of the existing hazards. Answering the
contention that the act of the vagrant was an intervening
cause, the court said:
The rule that the causal connection between a person's negligence
and an injury is broken 'by the intervention of a new independent,
5321 Ill. App. 432 at 437, 53 N. E. (2d) 295 at 297.
a 383 Il1. 366, 50 N. E. (2d) 497 (1943), noted in 22 CHICAGO-KENT LAW
REVIEW 152 and 38 Ill. L. Rev. 213, reversing 315 i. App. 599, 43 N. E. (2d)
604 (1942).
7 Davis v. South Side Elevated Railroad Co., 292
i. 378, 127 N. E. 66 (1920).
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efficient and intervening cause so that the negligence is not actionable
is subject to the qualification that if the intervening cause was
foreseen or reasonably might have been foreseen by the wrongdoer,
his negligence may be considered the proximate cause of the injury
and he may be held liable notwithstanding the intervening cause.
The intervening act of a third person does not necessarily relieve the
author of an earlier negligent or wrongful act from responsibility
when the intervening cause of an injury is of such nature as could
reasonably have been anticipated, in which case the earlier negligent
act, if it contributed to the injuries, may be regarded as the proximate cause."
In still another case, that of Hansen v. Henrici's, Incorporated,' an alleged condition created by the defendant was
held to be the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury, notwithstanding intervening negligence of others. That action was
for injuries sustained by plaintiff, an intended patron of defendant's restaurant, as the result of a fall caused when a
revolving door at the entrance to the restaurant was pushed
and caused to move rapidly by other patrons. There was evidence that one function of the flanges or strips on the side and
bottom of the door was to produce a friction which would prevent the door from being moved too rapidly, but that these
flanges or strips were worn and failed to maintain contact with
the wall or floor. In holding that there was evidence from
which the jury could reasonably return a verdict for the plaintiff, the court rejected the defendant's contention that it did
no more than create a condition which, when acted upon by
the independent conduct of a third person, produced the in10
jury.
8383

fl.

366 at 381, 50 N. E. (2d) 497 at 504.

9 319 Ill. App. 458, 49 N. E. (2d) 737 (1943), noted in 22 CHICAGO-KENT
LAW REVIEW 164.
10 On the subject of proximate cause, the court said: "We much doubt whether
the manifold problems arising out of the doctrine of proximate cause can be
solved by any metaphysical formula or made easier to solve by changes of
nomenclature. Whether we call the cause 'proximate,' 'legal' or 'direct' matters
little. It matters much that legal liability for bringing to pass that which harms
another should be placed on the right person... Whether the defendant In the
construction of this door was . . . at fault was, we hold, a question for the jury
to decide. Defendant invited plaintiff to its restaurant. The business was managed and controlled by it. Upon it was the duty of seeing that the ways of
ingress and egress to its place of business were reasonably safe. . . The question of whether defendant performed that duty was for the jury."-319 Ill.
App. 458 at 462, 49 N. E. (2d) 737 at 739.
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Three cases involved the doctrine of res ipsa oquitur. In
one, that of Oakdale Building Corporationv. Smithereen Company,11 suit was brought to recover for damage to real and personal property caused by fire which apparently originated in
the plaintiff's apartment when no one was there but which
was discovered shortly after the departure of the representative of the defendant exterminating company who had been
in control of the apartment for about one-half hour. The case
went to the jury solely on the testimony of the plaintiff since
the defendant offered no evidence. The trial court refused the
request of the plaintiff for a charge as to presumptive negligence but instead charged the jury that the burden was upon
the plaintiff to prove the specific negligence alleged in the complaint. The latter instruction was held sufficiently misleading
to warrant reversal because (1) no specific negligence had
been charged, and because (2) plaintiff had predicated its
case on the theory of res ipsa loquitur. The evidence offered
by the plaintiff was regarded as sufficient to raise the presumption of negligence and to require evidence from the defendant
in rebuttal particularly since there was evidence to negative
any inference that defective electric wiring or smoking in the
apartment were probable causes -of the fire.
Still another illustration has been added, by Paolinefli v.
Dainty Foods Manufacturers,Inc., 2 to former decisions wherein
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and also the "sealed package"
doctrine have been successfully invoked to impose liability
upon the original processor of food products for the benefit of
the ultimate consumer, even though the product was purchased
from an intervening retailer. The wrongful death of the infant
there concerned was alleged to have been occasioned by a piece
of bone or foreign matter in a certain "soup noodle mix" put
out by the defendant in a sealed glass jar, the contents of
which were used in a soup prepared therefrom and fed to the
infant. Despite conflicting evidence, a verdict and judgment
in favor of the plaintiff were affirmed. To counteract evidence
of want of due care, defendant showed that the chicken fat
used in the mixture, the component most likely to contain a
11

322 Ill. App. 222, 54 N. E. (2d) 231 (1944).
12322 Ill. App. 586, 54 N. E. (2d) 759 (1944).
denied.

Leave to appeal has been
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piece of bone, was government inspected. The court held that
such fact was proper evidence for the jury on the question of
negligence, but such inspection was not a substitute for due
care on the defendant's part.
In the third case, Nielsen v. Pyles," the Appellate Court reversed and remanded for a refusal on the part of the trial court
to give defendant's requested instruction, predicated upon his
evidence, which advanced the theory that the presumption of
negligence raised by the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is not
conclusive. It appeared from the facts that the plaintiff, an
automobile driver, had stopped his car for a stop light when
defendant, also driving an automobile, came up from behind,
carelessly struck plaintiff's car and propelled it forward suddenly. Plaintiff claimed that the impact produced a spinal
injury. Defendant offered evidence tending to show that the
spinal injury was produced by the subsequent acts of the plaintiff when endeavoring to raise the rear end of his automobile
in an effort to disengage the locked bumpers. As the original
accident itself afforded reasonable evidence of want of proper
care, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was applicable in the absence of any explanation. Since the defendant had offered evidence tending to rebut the presumption, however, it was held
improper to refuse a charge predicated upon defendant's theory of the case.
Several questions of law with respect to negligence were
also up for consideration. Carrellv. New York Central Railroad
Company 1, announces a distinction which must be drawn between the duties owed between users of a highway on the one
hand, and the corresponding duties owed in situations involving railroad crossings and approaching trains on the other.
Plaintiff's intestate in that case was struck and killed by defendant's train, which was admittedly running at a speed of
seventy to seventy-five miles per hour, while she was walking
across the railroad tracks at the point of their intersection
with a city street. No barrier or warning device was maintained there other than the usual fixed cross-arm sign and the
evidence preponderated to the effect that no warning bell or
13 322 Ill. App. 574, 54 N. E. (2d) 753 (1944).
14 384 Ill. 599, 52 N. E. (2d) 201 (1944), affirming 317 Ili. App. 481, 47 N. E.
(2d) 130 (1943).
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whistle was sounded by the train. An unobstructed view for
over seven hundred feet could be had in the direction from
which the train was approaching and it was admitted that the
plaintiff's intestate saw the train when she was about ten feet
from the crossing and while the train was still from eight hundred to eleven hundred feet away, but it was necessary for
her to focus her attention on her footing owing to the broken,
rough and irregular condition of the walk leading up to the
track and the steepness of the incline. Relying principally
upon Blumb v. Getz, 1 5 a case involving a pedestrian and an
automobile on a highway, it was argued on behalf of the plaintiff that the decedent had a right, as a reasonably prudent
person, under the circumstances, to believe the train would be
travelling at a reasonable rate of speed and also to assume
that she would have ample time to cross in safety in the absence of a warning signal apprising her of danger. In disposing of such contention, the court said:
The observations made in the Blumb case upon which plaintiff
places reliance are not applicable to railroad crossings. A highway motorist, presumably being in control of his automobile, a maneuverable
conveyance, can readily bring his machine to a stop or change its
course out of the sphere of danger. This is not true of railroads,
which are engaged in the performance of a business of quasi-public
nature, and, in carrying out the purposes for which they are created, must necessarily often operate their trains at such a high
rate of speed they cannot be brought to a sudden stop without endangering the lives and safety of the passengers. Moreover, trains
travel on fixed tracks, and it is impossible for them to turn aside or
change their course in order to prevent injury to a person attempting
to cross the tracks when a train is approaching. Where a railroad
train and a person travelling on a highway each approaches a railroad crossing at the same time, it is not the duty of the company
to stop its train, but is, instead, the duty of the traveller, in obedience
to the known custom of the country, to stop and not attempt to pass
in front of the approaching train.'"
Imputed negligence was one of the points at issue in De
Buck v. Gadde where plaintiff, owner and operator of a rid15 366 fI1. 273, 8 N. E. (2d) 620 (1937).
16 384 l1. 599 at 606, 52 N. E. (2d) 201 at 205.
17 319 Ill. App. 609, 49 N. E. (2d) 789 (1943).
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ing stable, had rented one of his saddle-horses to a horseman
for a ride. The horse later appeared riderless upon an adjoining boulevard where the animal was run down by a passing
motorist driving at a speed greatly in excess of the legal limit.
The driver of the car had knowledge of the intersection of a
bridle path with the boulevard near that point and saw the
horse before the accident. After deciding that the horse was
not "running at large" within the meaning of the statute,"
the trial court instructed the jury to the effect that the negligence of the bailee could not be imputed to the bailor. Such
instruction was held proper.
In another negligence case, that of NationalBuilders Bank
of Chicago v. Schuham,9 plaintiff's intestate was employed, as
an independent contractor, to paint the window sashes of defendant's building. Decedent fell to his death when a rotted
portion of a wooden sash which he was painting gave way. The
trial court granted defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict thereby deciding, as a matter of law, that
the defendant was not guilty of fault. Although the Appellate
Court found some evidence of contributory negligence and also
of assumption of the risk on the part of plaintiff's intestate,
it expressly preferred to rest its decision on the failure of
plaintiff to prove actionable negligence on the part of the
defendant. The rot or decay was inside the sash, and there
was no evidence that any of it was discernible on the outside.
The court held that, as a matter of law, the defendant could
not be guilty of negligence unless the requirement to use reasonable care to protect those lawfully on his premises placed
upon him the duty of testing the wood in the sashes of all the
windows covered by the contract before permitting decedent
to paint the same. It concluded that the defendant was under
no such duty. To arrive at that result it was necessary to distinguish the case from that of Houlihan v. Sulzberger & Sons
Company 20 which the court did by pointing out that in the
latter case the rotted condition of the ends of certain ladder
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1943, Ch. 8, §1.
19319 IlM. App. 546, 49 N. E. (2d) 825 (1943).
20282 Il. 76, 118 N. E. 429 (1918).
Th

SURVEY

OF ILLINOIS LAW-1948-19J4

rungs there concerned was one open and obvious and discoverable by the exercise of ordinary care.21
A claim of fraud- and deceit was presented in LAckus v.
O'Donnell 22 where plaintiff, desiring to purchase business property in a certain subdivision adjacent to a highway, went to
a firm of real estate brokers with whom lots in that subdivivision had been listed for sale. One of the firm's agents took
plaintiff to the subdivision and showed him a lot marked by
a "For Sale'" sign erected by the firm and told plaintiff that
it was the lot which they had for sale. The plaintiff indicated
that he did not care for the lot as it was low and wet, but that
he would be willing to pay more for a lot upon higher ground.
The situation terminated with plaintiff's purchase of a lot in
the subdivision owned by defendant. Delivery of the deed was
made through the real estate firm whose agent had shown the
lot to the plaintiff. Plaintiff thereafter erected a sheet metal
garage building upon the lot which, he claimed, was the one
shown him. That lot was, in fact, located in another block in
the same subdivision. When the mistake was discovered, plaintiff moved the garage building to the lot to which he had actually acquired title, a distance of about one hundred and fifty
yards, and brought action against the vendor for the damages
occasioned by the erection of the building upon the wrong lot.
The court, very properly it appears under the factual situation
presented, found an absence of any fraudulent intent to deceive
on the vendor's part which would be an indispensable element
to the successful maintenance of an action for fraud and deceit.
A statement by the court to the effect that the case involved'
the question of identity of property, rather than active fraud
and deceit, presents an interesting question. It is generally
considered, on questions of identity of property, that where a
vendor points out a lot or tract to a purchaser he is bound
to do so correctly, and where the purchaser is ignorant of the
location, he has a right to rely upon the positive statement
and representation of the vendor and to hold him responsi21 It
should be noted, however, that the Houlihan case went to the jury and
the point was decided as a question of fact rather than, as in the instant case,
settled as a matter of law.
22 321 Ill. App. 144, 52 N. iB. (2d) 271 (1943).
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ble." As the vendor never, personally, pointed out the property that principle could hardly apply but the discussion ignored the question as to the possible agency of the real estate
firm to act for the vendor in showing the property.
The chance of a claim of nuisance by -those who become
residents of an industrial district, or who remain while a residential neighborhood gradually becomes a manufacturing district, was somewhat restricted by the Illinois Supreme Court
decision in Gardner v. International Shoe Company.4 The
nuisance there complained of grew out of the maintenance of
a pond or settling basin, installed by a tannery at the direction
of the Sanitary Board of Illinois, for the purpose of receiving
and holding the effluent of the tanning process before the same
was drained into an adjoining river. The operation of the
plant was shown to be modern and in accordance with the best
practices in such line of business. The hygenic director of the
Sanitary Board, a licensed physician, also testified that the
odors emitted by the pond were not deleterious or injurious
to health and were substantially the same as the odors emanating from the tannery itself. It was also proven that it was
impossible to tan hides without this odor. The court, after
noting that the question involved had received considerable
attention but not with complete uniformity of result, proceeded
to an exhausive review of the subject by citing and quoting
from textual authority I and from decided cases in Illinois 11
as well as from other jurisdictions" and arrived at an ultimate conclusion that the unlimited and undisturbed enjoyment
which one is entitled to have of his own property is qualified
to the extent that trifling inconveniences resulting from the
useful employment of adjacent property must be submitted to
- Jack v. McConkey, 208 ill App. 84 (1917), abst. opinion.
24 386 Ill. 418, 54 N. E. (2d) 482 (1944), affirming 319 Il. App. 416, 49 N. E.
(2d) 328 (1943).
23 Cooley, Torts, 4th Ed., Vol. 3, §429.
28 City of Pana v. Central Washed Coal Co., 260
l. 111, 102 N. E. 992 (1913);
Cooper v. Randall, 59 Ill. 317 (1871); Lambeau v. Lewinski, 47 fI1. App. 656
(1893).
27 Dixie Ice Cream Co. v. Blackwell, 217 Ala. 330, 116 So. 348 (1928); Thompson v. Elzy, 83 Ind. App. 215, 148 N. E. 154 (1925); Higgins v. Decorah Produce
Co., 214 Iowa 276, 242 N. W. 109 (1932); Prest v. Ross, 245 Mass. 342, 139
N. E. 792 (1923); Strachan v. Beacon Oil Co., 251 Mass. 479, 146 N. E. 787
(1925); Eller v. Koehler, 68 Ohio St. 51, 67 N. E. 89 (1903); Ebur v. Alloy
Metal Wire Co., 304 Pa. 177, 155 A. 280 (1931); Clark v. Wambold, 165 Wis
70, 160 N. W. 1039 (1917).
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when what is complained of arises from and is suitable to the
locality and is reasonable under the circumstances.
One other case is worthy of attention, that of London &
8 wherein
LancashireIndemnity Company of America v. Duner,2
a president of an Illinois corporation, which company had been
dissolved prior to the time suit was instituted in its name by
such officer, was held liable in tort for damages suffered by
the plaintiff in conducting a successful defense to that suit,
Resort to or conduct of legal remedies would ordinarily involve no such liability for tort usually arises in such situations only when the actor is motivated by malice or want of
probable cause. It was held, nevertheless, that since the corporation was no longer in existence the president was totally
lacking in authority to institute the prior proceeding in its
name so could be held despite his lack of knowledge of the
dissolution of the company.
(To be continued)
2 135 F. (2d) 895, 146 A. L. R. 1119 (1943), noted in 22 CHICAGO-KENT
LAW REVIEW 166. Evans, C. J., concurred in the result.
* The balance of this survey will appear in the March issue. Government
limitations on the use of newsprint make this action necessary.

